CHAND MAL ALIAS CHAND RATAN Vs. CHHITAR NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present petition has been filed by the petitioner-defendant no.7, challenging the order dated 9.4.2012, passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Sikar, (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate Court),rejecting the application of the petitioner seeking review of the order dated 19.10.2011, passed by the said court.

(2.) IT appears that the respondent no. 1-plaintiff, has filed the suit before the trial court against the respondent nos. 2 to 8, seeking cancellation of the sale-deed dated 12.1.1998, executed by the defendant no.4 in favour of defendant nos. 1 and 2 and also for permanent injunction in respect of the land in question. The respondent-plaintiff had also filed an application seeking temporary injunction. The present petitioner was subsequently impleaded as the party defendant no. 8 in the suit and as defendant no.7 in the application for temporary injunction, vide the order dated 19.10.2011. It further appears that in the same order dated 19.10.2011,the trial court after recording the consent of the learned counsels for the parties directed the defendant nos. 1 to 4 and 7 to maintain status-quo as regards the possession and the record of the land in question. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted an application seeking review of the said order stating interalia that the counsel appearing for the petitioner i.e. the defendant no. 7 in the temporary injunction application was not authorized to give consent and, therefore, the said order dated 19.10.2011 was required to be reviewed. The said application has been rejected by the trial court vide the impugned order dated 9.4.2012.

(3.) HAVING regard to the submissions made by learned counsel Mr. Goyal for the petitioner and to the impugned order dated 9.4.2012, it appears that the trial court has rejected the application of the petitioner seeking review of the order dated 19.10.2011 on the ground that the said order was passed with the consent of learned counsels for the parties including the counsel for the present petitioner. The said fact has also not been disputed in the present petition. Merely because the petitioner subsequently moved an application that he did not authorize his counsel to give consent, would not make the order of the court illegal, when the counsel had in fact given consent in the court on behalf of his client. It is needless to say that the statement made by the counsel would be binding to the parties who had engaged him to represent the said party.