RISHABHWADI JAIN SHWETAMBER MURTI PUJAK TRUST Vs. MAHAVEER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust through its trustee Shri Jugraj and others against the defendant tenant Mahaveer s/o Balu Singh being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the court below of the learned Civil Judge-cum- Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sojat allowing the defendant-tenant's appeal No.63/90 (11/90) Mahaveer vs. Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust dated 26.11.1993 reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Sojat, Pali decreeing the suit No.75/84 - Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust vs. Mahaveer Singh, dated 18.01.1990.

(2.) The two suit shops in question situated at village Chandawal, Sojat, district Pali were given on rent @ Rs.20/- per month for each shops to the defendant-respondent under the rent note dated 01.04.1979. The defendant paid rent only up to 31.5.1984 and, thereafter did not pay any rent. The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the lease and also claimed the bonafide need of the suit premises for the purpose of Trust. The suit was decreed by the learned trial court, however, the learned appellate court reversed the said finding on issue No.4 on the ground that the plaintiff Trust failed to prove that the notice under Section 106 of the Act of 15 days was served upon the defendant tenant. The notice Ex.2 has been placed on record and the same said to have been sent by registered AD post.

(3.) Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Arpit Bhoot submitted that in view of the amended provisions of Section 106(3) of the Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, providing for Transitory provisions, since the receipt of the notice was admitted by the defendant lessee, it could not be said to be invalid in view of the said provision of Section 3 of the Amending Act and consequently, the appellate court has erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court on this ground alone.