SHIV DAYAL GUPTA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dt. 9. 11. 2000 compulsorily retiring him from the post of Addl. District Judge in the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. The petitioner was appointed as Munsiff Magistrate, vide order dated 6. 05. 1970. He was confirmed in the Rajasthan Judicial Service w. e. f. 14th May 1972. Vide order dated 7. 01. 1994, the petitioner was granted selection scale in the Rajasthan Judicial Service w. e. f. 2. 09. 1992. w. e. f. 1. 01. 1993, he was granted super time scale in the Rajasthan Judicial Service vide order dated 25. 6. 99. On 26th May 1993, the petitioner was promoted to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge. On 9. 11. 2000, the impugned order of compulsory retirement from service was passed qua the petitioner under sub-rule (2) of Rule 244 of the Rajasthan Service Rules (Old/rule 53 (1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996.

(2.) RULE 53 (1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension RULEs, 1996, reads as under: " RULE 53- Compulsory retirement on completion of 25 years qualifying service: (1) At any time after a Government servant has completed twenty five years of qualifying service or has attained the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier, he may be required by the appointing authority to retire in the public interest and in the case of such retirement, the Government servant shall be entitled to a retiring pension. "

(3.) IN Baikuntha Nath Das and another vs. Chief (District Medical Officer, Baripada and another (1), the Supreme Court enumerated the following principles in this behalf : " (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma not any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) malafide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short; if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks loss their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. "