HEERA LAL Vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL UDAIPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition has been filed by the plaintiff against the order of the Munsif City (North), Udaipur dated December 11, 1990 by which he has closed his evidence. The facts of the case giving rise to this revision may be summarised thus.

(2.) IN the year 1982, the plaintiff filed a suit against the Municipal Council, Udaipur and the Assistant Engineer, National Highway, Udaipur for injunction in respect of a piece of land given to him for temporary use as a licencee by the Municipal Council. The defendants are contesting the suit. The plaintiff did not produce his evidence despite innumerable adjournments and ultimately his evidence was closed by the trial court on December 11, 1990 by its impugned order.

(3.) IN Rupendra Deb v. Ashrumati Debi (supra) relied by the learned counsel, it has been observed as follows: "after all the procedure of the Court is to aid the administration of justice and not to hamper it. The law of procedure must be followed as it represents experience of ages and helps the administration of justice. But I apprehend wherein the peculiar circumstances of a case, there is a conflict between the law of procedure and the substantial rights of the parties, the Court or a Judge is justified in ignoring, I should say it is the duty of the Judge or the Court to ignore, the procedure. IN this case, though the Judge was strictly right in the view he took, I think he should have shown a little more for bearance (to see the words of Mac-pherson J. IN Kapilnauth's case (10 Beng. L. R. 168 ). and allowed the new matters to go in. " It was not and could not be the contention of the learned counsel that it is the substantial right of a party that his case should continue for recording his evidence till he himself closes his evidence and the court cannot close his evidence and proceed further even after fixing several dates for this purpose. It has rightly been observed that law of procedure must be followed as it represents experience of ages and helps the administration of justice. As a matter of fact the learned trial court did not follow the law of procedure (above quoted proviso (b) when it granted adjournments after adjournments as there is nothing on the record to indicate that adjournments were granted as the circumstances were beyond the control of the plaintiff on these dates. The mandatory provisions were breached and betrayed (1979 (2) RCJ 375 para 21) (6) by it.