CHANDANI Vs. RAJASTHAN STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Civil regular first appeal by Mst. Chandni, widow of Hiralal plaintiff, against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Balotra, dated the 23rd december, 1954, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff Hiralal thed after the decision of the suit by the trial court and before the present appeal was filed, and so this appeal was preferred by the present appellant, being his sole representative.

(2.) IT is common ground between the parties that the plaintiff Hiralal worked as a retail cheap grain shop agent of the State for the Guda Chohtan area from the 16th June, 1949 to the 18th August, 1949. One Balchand Geimal was the wholesale distributor of grain for this area at the relevant time. The plaintiff was caught having sold some 18 bags of grain in black-market, and for this it appears that he was subjected to a fine of Rs. 1500/ -. The case of the plaintiff is that at that time there were some 221 bags of grain in his godown (with which alone we are concerned in this appeal), and a 'chepa' was put on it by defendant No. 3 Faujraj, a famine clerk in the office of the Tehsildar, under the orders of defendant No. 2, radhakishen, the Tehsildar, on the 18th August, 1949, and eventually these goods were removed from his godown in his absence on the 12th and 13th September, 1949. According to the plaintiff, the total amount of grain in these bags weighed 551 maunds and 8 seers and the price thereof in accordance with the controlled rate of rs. 13/5/4 per maund amounted to Rs. 7349/2/9. The plaintiff's case further was that, apart from the afore-mentioned bags, four bags of gram weighing 11 maunds and 12 1/2 seers were also removed by the order of the Tehsildar and the price thereof was Rs. 150/13/3, but this part of the plaintiff's case was not sought to be pressed before me, and, therefore, I shall say nothing more about this. Thus the plaintiff's claim is for a total sum of Rs. 7349/2/9 plus Rs. 150/13/3 equal to rs. 7500/ -. To this, he added a. sum of Rs. 1300/-by way of interest from the date of actual removal of the bags namely the 12th. and 13th September, 1949, upto the date of suit, namely, the 12th September, 1952. Before filing the suit, the plaintiff alleges to have given a notice to the Collector, barmer, on behalf of the State on the 4th June, 1951, under Section 80 C. P. C. but without any result. It may be mentioned at this place that the plaintiff. did not give any separate notices to defendants Nos. 2. and 3 Radhakishen and Faujraj respectively, Eventually he filed the present suit in the court of the District Judge, balotra, on the 1. 2th September, 1952, claiming a sum of Rs. 8800/- against the defendant State and in the alternative against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 radhakishen and Faujraj. This suit was transferred for trial, by the District Judge to the Civil Judge, Balotra. On an objection having been raised, on behalf of the defendants Radhakishen and faujraj that the suit against them was not maintainable as no notices had been given to them under Section 80 C. P. C. the trial Judge held that as both these defendants were being sued for certain acts done by them in their official capacity and as the contention raised by them that no notice had been given to them under section 80 was correct, the suit could not proceed against them and he therefore reflected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C. P. C. so far as these defendants were concerned. Thereafter the suit proceeded only against defendant No. 1 the States

(3.) THE State resisted the suit. Unfortunately, however, the written statement filed on behalf of the State is a highly vague and an extremely unsatisfactory piece of pleading with the result that not more is sought to be read into it by the learned. Assistant Government Advocate, who has appeared before me on its behalf, than what can be legitimately read into it. Be that as it may, its main defence is contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement. That defence is that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the price of the 221 bags of grain because he had not paid the price thereof presumably to the wholesale agent. Balchand geimal and had committed a breach of the agreement dated the 4th November, 1949. I pause here to point out that, for one thing, this agreement obviously bears a date subsequent to the alleged seizure, and, therefore, it does not seem to be relevant, and, in any case, no one on the side of the defendant State has cared to prove it. Coming back from this digression to the main point, it was pleaded that the Government had a lien to retain the grain which was in the possession of the retail agent on the cancellation of his licence and had a further right to have it delivered to the new or the succeeding agent. It may be mentioned here that no facts were stated as to how it was the duty of the State to see that the retail agent should have paid the price of the grain received by him to wholesaler, and how it came to the notice of the State that such price had not been paid. It was further mentioned in paragraph six of the written statement that defendant No. 2 had full authority to get the grain in question, delivered to another agent on the cancellation of the plaintiff's licence and when he had failed to pay the price thereof. It may also be noted that both in paragraphs No. 1 and No. 8, the State pleaded that it was responsible for all lawful acts done by defendants Nos. 2 and 3; but strikingly enough, not a word was said to indicate. that the acts of its officers mentioned above were outside the scope of their authority, though a faint attempt was made during the course of arguments before me to read this plea into the written statement which could not possibly be allowed. It was also mentioned in the additional pleas that the wholesale agent Messrs. Balchand Geimal had filed a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 2000/-from the plaintiff in the Court of the Munsiff, Barmer, and that that suit had been decreed. It is, however, not possible to understand what help the defendant State can derive from this allegation in the absence of certain other facts which have not at all been mentioned. Lastly it was pleaded that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were necessary parties to the suit, and as the plaint had been rejected with respect to them already, this suit could not possibly be maintained against the State in their absence and the whole suit should be thrown out on that ground alone.