TULSA Vs. SURATRAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) come up before me under sec. 13(2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, as the learned Members of the Bench who heard it were divided in their opinion as to the order to be made in it.

(2.) I have had the advantage of going through the judgments of my learned colleagues. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well. The appellant brought a suit on 20.3.1958 for a permanent injunction against the respondents in respect of the land in dispute with the allegations that he had been in possession as a tenant for the last 20 years paying rent to the respondents and that the respondents were threatening to dispossess him. An application for grant of a temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit was also moved by the appellant and the same was granted by the trial court. The respondents in their written statement pleaded that the appellant was admitted on theka for a period of one year only, that thereafter he continued in possession unlawfully, that before the Panchayat Board the appellant had transferred possession over the land in favour of the respondents. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties the trial court ? came to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession at the time of the institution of this suit and that the respondents inspite of the issue of a temporary injunction wrongfully dispossessed the appellant. The trial court granted a decree in favour of the appellant accordingly. The first appellate court held that after the institution of the suit the appellant was dispossessed and hence his proper remedy was to file a suit for recovery of possession. it was also admitted before him on behalf of the appellant that such a suit had been filed and on this ground alone the decision of the trial court was set aside. In second appeal one of the learned Members of the Bench Shri R. N. Hawa held that the ground on which the learned Additional Commissioner rejected the suit was untenable, as under inherent powers of the court conferred by sec. 151 C.P.C. possession could be restored to the appellant. The other learned Member Shri Khemchand has not expressed any different opinion on this proposition of law. He was however of the opinion that "the trial court did not hold that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendants subsequent to its order dated 19.4.54" He was also of the view that as a suit for recovery of possession had already been instituted by the appellant it would not be proper to interfere in second appeal and that there was no occasion to exercise the powers under sec. 151. C.P.C.

(3.) As observed by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in I.L.R. 3 (1953) Rajasthan 866 "The general rule is that the rights of parties to a suit must be regulated with their state at the date of the institution of the suit and the suit must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as existed on the date of its commencement, and the relief claimed in the suit must be confined to matters existing at that date. But there are exceptions to this general rule and it is open to a court in exceptional cases to take into consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the suit and grant relief on their basis where the relief as claimed originally in the suit may have become inappropriate by reason of altered circumstances and where this may appear to be necessary to shorten un -necessary litigation between the parties or tend to subserve the substantial interest of justice. Such a power has been held to subsist even at the stage of appeal". A similar view was expressed by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in Neelkanth Vs. State of Rajasthan (1957 RLW 20 ) In that case the plaintiff was dispossessed during the pendency of the litigation and he was put back in possession for restoration of the status quo before the suit. A similar view was taken in Azim Khan Vs. State (1958 RLW 90 ) In that case the plaintiffs had brought a suit for declaration and injunction only but before an injunction could be served on the State the plaintiff had been dispossessed. The question arose as to whether an amendment of the plaint was necessary or not. The decisions referred to above were quoted with approval and it was held that to insist on an amendment would be an entirely,un -necessary protraction of the litigation and that a relief for possession could be granted to them because of subsequent developments.