ARJANDAS Vs. GOVERNMENT OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a writ application by Arjandas under Art. 226 of the Constitution by which an order of the State Government dated the 30th January, 1961 superseding the Municipal Council of the City of Ajmer and appointing the Collector, Ajmer, to exercise during the period of the supersession all powers and duties of the said Council is sought to be quashed.

(2.) THE petitioner was a member of the Ajmer Municipal Council having been elected to the Ajmer Municipal Committee as it was then called at the last general election held on the 31st January, 1957, under the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation No. VI of 1925. It is not in dispute that the first meeting of the aforesaid Municipal Committee was held on the 10th February, 1957, and its normal term of three years was due to expire on the 9th February, 1960. Meanwhile the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1960 (Act No. 38 of 1959) (hereinafter called the Rajasthan Act) had come into force and the Ajmer Municipal Committee was to be known as the Ajmer Municipal Council under the new Act. It is common ground that by a notification dated the 23rd February, 1960, published in an Extraordinary issue of the Rajasthan Rajpatra the term of this Council was extended under Sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Act upto the 30th June, 1960, or the formation of the new Council whichever was earlier. That this notification was issued after the normal three-year term of the Council had ended on the 9th February 1960 is not disputed before us. By another notification dated the 14th June, the term of the Council was further extended upto the 30th September, 1960 until the formation of the new Board whichever was to be earlier. No new Council was, however, formed, with the result that a further extension in the term of the Council was granted upto the 31st January, 1961, by a notification dated the 31st October, 1960 published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated the 1st November, 1960. It may be noted in passing that the term of the Council had expired on the 30th September, 1960, and the last-mentioned notification was issued not earlier than the 31st October, 1960, after the expiry of the extended term. THEn by a notification dated the 30th January, 1961 which is impugned before us, the State Government superseded this Council and appointed the Collector Ajmer by virtue of his office to exercise all the powers and duties thereof. This notification is in the following terms: - "notification. Jaipur, January 30, 1960. No. F. 1 (36) L. S. G. /60- Whereas the term of the Municipal Council of the City of Ajmer will expire on 31st January, 1961; And whereas the State Government is satisfied that the new Municipal Council of the City of Ajmer is not likely to be formed shortly; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 295 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959), the State Government hereby supersedes the said Municipal Council of the City of Ajmer with immediate effect for a period of six months or till the day immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the said Council to be re-constituted whichever may be earlier. Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec (5) of the said Sec. 295 of the said Act, the State Government hereby appoints the Collector, Ajmer, by virtue of his office to exercise, during the aforesaid period of supersession, all powers and duties of the said Council. " By Order of the Governor, A. K. Roy, Secretary of the Government. " THE case of the petitioner is that the aforesaid notification was entirely illegal and of no effect and deserves to be quashed. This contention, broadly speaking, is sought to be supported on two grounds. THE first is that the order of supersession was illegal inasmuch as by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 11 (2) of the Rajasthan Act, the term of the members of the Council must be deemed to have been extended to, and so as to expire with the day immediately preceding the date of first meeting of the new Board when it is formed. It is further argued in this connection that by virtue of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Transitory Provisions) Order 1960 (No. III) of 1960 issued under Sec. 301 of the Rajasthan Act, the term of the superseded Ajmer Municipal Council was extensible upto a period of two years instead of only one year with effect from the date of the expiry of its original term with the result that there was no legal hindrance to this Council working upto the 9th February, 1962. That being so, it is contended that the term of this Council stood automatically extended upto the 9th February, 1962, or the date of the first meeting of the new Council whenever it should come into existence by virtue of the provision contained in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 and that the State Govt. , had no jurisdiction to order the supersession of the Council as it has done apparently on the ground that its term had come to an end. It was also brought to our notice in this connection that the Govt. , had granted extensions to this Council from time to time so long as its chairman was a nominee of the ruling party in the State upto the 24th Nov. , 1960, and that it resorted to the expedient of supersession simply because at the election for the office of the Chairman held on the 6th November, 1960, in consequence of the removal of the aforesaid chairman by a motion of no-confidence, its nominee was defeated and another chairman not belonging to the ruling party happened to be elected. THE second contention was that the State Government had indicated no reason or reasons for the supersession of this Council in its impugned order, and that there was nothing to indicate that the Government was satisfied that the Council had defaulted in the performance of its lawful duties or had exceeded or abused its powers. It was further submitted in this connection that no action could be taken against the Council under Sec. 295 of the Rajasthan Act unless it had been afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in defence of the action that was sought to be taken against it.

(3.) IF this then is the correct meaning to put on sub-sec. (2) as we think it is, the petitioner cannot receive any assistance from it. Here was a case of a board whose term of office as extended had expired and there was no newly constituted board waiting to take office and hold its first meeting, and, consequently, there was no question of any automatic extension of its term within the meaning of sec. 11 (2) as we have felt persuaded to interpret above. And that being so, we hold that it is entirely fallacious to think that its term was automatically extended to an indefinite point of time which would be in the womb of future depending upon the pleasure of the Government of the day to hold new elections and bring into existence a new council. It is true that its term could yet be extended by the State Government up till the 9th February 1962 if the latter so thought fit; but that is a very different thing from saying that its term would necessarily enure without an affirmative or positive order of extension up to that date or that the Government was legally bound to extend it until that date.