RAJENDRA Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition has been filed by the accused petitioner against the order dated 17. 8. 2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast track), Nagaur in Sessions case No. 96/2001 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has framed charges against the accused petitioner for offence under Sections 452, 323, 324, 325, 326 and Section 308 I. P. C.

(2.) IT arises in the following circumstances : (i) On 12. 2. 99 a FIR, being FIR No. 15/99 was lodged by one Parsu Ram with the police Station Mundwa, Distt. Nagaur alleging inter alia that in the evening at about 6 p. m. the accused petitioner entered the house of injured Mega Ram and assaulted him on the ground by which he fell on the ground and became unconscious. He was taken to the hospital.

(3.) IN my opinion the submissions which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not to be appreciated at this stage. The Judge is not obliged to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if provided would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh (1), has given guidelines for High Court as well as Lower Court while dealing with the matters of framing charges and has held as under : "reading the two provisions in Sections 227 and 228 together, it would @ clear that, at the beginning and initial stage of the trial, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. The judge is not obliged at that stage of the trial, to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt, the case is to end in his acquittal. But if on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227. "