GAURI SHANKER Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this criminal misc. petition under section 482 Cr.RC., petitioner seeks quashing of criminal proceedings pending against him before the trial court. The petitioner is facing trial for offence under section 411 I.RC. the petitioner filed an application before the trial court on 31.1.2001 for closing of prosecution evidence and decision on the basis of whatever evidence recorded by the trial court. Vide order dated 3.2.2001, the trial court dismissed the said application.

(2.) By this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of whole proceedings on the ground that petitioner is facing trial for last 7 years and the trial could not be completed even after completion of 7 years. The offence for which the petitioner is charged, is under section 411 IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment for 3 years.

(3.) It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a case in which the punishment prescribed is for a period of 3 years and if the prosecution does not complete its evidence within a period of 2 years from the date of framing of charge, then the evidence of the prosecution should be closed. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court Issued certain directions for effective enforcement of the right to speedy trial flowing from Art. 21 of the Constitution. A petition was filed before the Honourable Supreme Court for directions/modifications/clarification of the directions of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra), in Raj Deo Sharma (II) Vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604 , the Honourable Supreme Court held that in fact, in the judgment. In the main appeal in the present case, the Supreme Court has not fixed any time limit for conclusion of trial. As such, the Honourable Supreme Court has only laid down guidelines for closing the prosecution evidence in certain circumstances. There is difference between time fixing for disposal of a trial and fixing time limit for prosecution to complete its evidence. A perusal of the guidelines contained in the main judgment would itself show that there is no hard and fast rule applicable to every case, irrespective of facts and circumstances thereof. If the delay is not due to any fault of the prosecution, it is open to the prosecution to place the relevant facts before the court and seek further time for producing its evidence. The judgment in appeal cannot be understood as punishing the prosecution and preventing it from adducing evidence when it is not responsible for the delay.