SURAJ MAL Vs. KHUMANI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties. The present suit was filed on 22. 10. 80 by plaintiffs Bhawar Lal, Satya Narain, Jatan Lal and Dwarka Das. Plaintiff Bhanwar Lal died on 5. 12. 81, plaintiff No. 2 Satya Narain died on 25. 12. 91, plaintiff Jatan Lal died on 26. 7. 88 and plaintiff Dwarka Das died on 10. 12. 87. The present controversy is with respect to the taking on record the persons who are claiming that right to prosecute the suit devolves upon them. Earlier on an application filed on 5. 3. 82, it is mentioned that plaintiff Bhanwar Lal expired on 5. 12. 81 and one Satya Narain S/o Basu Dev adopted son of Naraindas was appointed as Trustee President and, therefore, name of deceased Bhanwar Lal be struck-off and name of Satya Narain be permitted to be arrayed as plaintiff No. 1. This application was pending for long time and thereafter the application was submitted by defendants on 8. 1. 93 stating that plaintiff No. 1, 3 and 4 Bhanwar Lal, Jatan Lal and Dwarka Das died several years ago and since plaintiff No. 2 Satya Narain also died, therefore, suit stand abated be dismissed. After this application, an application under O. 22 R. 10 CPC was filed by 5 persons i. e. Khamani Lal S/o Gewar Chand, Srigopal S/o Bhanwar Lal, Jhanwar Lal S/o Nath Mal, Ramswaroop S/o Sohan Lal and Bhanwar Lal S/o Dal Chand. This application was filed on 18. 9. 93. The trial court after hearing the arguments of the parties by order dated 6. 10. 94 allowed the application of the applicants mentioned above which was challenged by defendants by filing SBC Revision Pet. No. 45/95 which was decided by this court on 7. 1. 97 and this Court allowed the revision petition with the direction to the trial court to dispose of the applications for substitution in place of original plaintiffs pending before it in accordance with law after providing adequate opportunity of hearing to the parties and in this order, learned Single Judge directed trial court to proceed expeditiouly and thereafter impugned order dated 20. 10. 97 was passed by trial court by which the applicants were again permitted to continue the suit under O. 22 R. 10 CPC. Being aggrieved against the above order dated 20. 10. 97, the appellant-defendants preferred these appeals.

(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the para No. 12 of the plaint wherein it is specifically mentioned that suit was filed by the plaintiff as trustee for the disputed property and also pointed out that plaintiffs in original suit, claimed relief of cancellation of orders dated 21. 2. 80 and order dated 6. 3. 79 by which order, the Asstt. Commissioner, Devasthan and Commissioner, Devasthan passed the above mentioned orders of registration of trust. As a consequence whereof, the trust was registered at S. No. 156. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that suit filed by the plaintiff was in the capacity of the trustee for the property in dispute and the applicants are also claiming that they are elected trustees. According to learned counsel for the appellant, as per Sec. 41 and 42 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, unless appropriate order is passed under the above provisions, no one can be recognised as trustee and for any public trust, according to learned counsel for the appellant, the order passed under Sec. 42 of the above Act of 1959 is given finality in sub- clause (2) of Sec. 42 and, therefore, since the applicants have not obtained any permission or order from the competent authority, therefore, applicants cannot be permitted to be impleaded as party in the suit and since all the original plaintiffs have died, therefore, suit stand abated and cannot be continued.

(3.) ACCORDING to learned counsel for the appellant, by permitting these persons in the capacity of trustees, it is nothing but recognising the deed of 1933 in the manner to give right to the claimants to claim themselves as trustees. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant are absolutely erroneous in the sense that the point in controversy in the main suit is the deed of 1933 and until & unless, a final adjudication is given merely because persons were permitted to be impleaded as party, they were not acquiring the right, title or interest or any other right except the right to continue the suit, therefore, the apprehension raised by the learned counsel for the appellant not well founded.