(1.) THE petitioner has challenged the Notification Anx. 2 dated 12. 1. 90, by which Anx. 3 has been amended and has also prayed for certain consequential reliefs.
(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also Mr. Rajesh Balia, appearing for the respondents at some length.
(3.) FACED with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that as a matter of fact no interval has been provided under sec. 10a for the payment of tax as the tax has to be paid immediately on the sale being effected, as is envisaged by this section and, therefore, by mere reference of sec. 7 (2a), it cannot be said that the notification only provides for intervals shorter than those prescribed in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 7. In this connection, learned counsel drew my attention to the meaning of the term 'interval' in various dictioneries the purport of which appears to be that there must be some period of time interven ng between two events, but he argues, here there is no such intervals at all. I am not impressed by this argument either. When sec. 7 (2a) authorises the State Government to require any dealer or class of dealers to pay tax at intervals shorter than those prescribed in sub-sec. (1), it has also power to cut the interval to nil. Here, the term 'shorter' does not necessarily mean that there must be some gap between the payment of tax and the sale being effected. The liability to tax arises as soon as the sale is completed. It is a different matter when and how the liabi-lityis to be enforced. Reference in this connection may be made to Kalika Veera Redely & Co. vs. State of A. P. (!) and Builders's Association of India vs. Union of India (2 ). There is no dispute before me that the members of the petitioner are liable to pay tax on the sale of their commodities and, therefore, if a convenient mode of realising the tax is being prescribed in the Notification Anx. 2 specially with a view to prevent evasion of tax, the petitioner cannot make a grouse against that.