SAMPAT LAL Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE 22 similar writ petitions have been filed for quashing the decision Annexure 2 of the Mines (Group II) Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur dated March 25, 1989 by which it decided to withdraw the working permission given in the years 1983 and 1984 to Rajasthan State Mineral Development Corporation (in short RSMDC ) to undertake mining of marbles in the areas of Rajsamand, granted mining lease, in relaxation of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (hereinafter to be called the 1986 Rules) "to (1) M/s. International Mineral Industries Limited (10 plots), (2) M/s. Mewar Marbles Limited (10 plots), (3) MLS. Saxena Marbles Ltd. (5 plots), (4) MLS Nirmal Marbles Ltd. (5 plots) and MLS Aditya Mining Limited (5 plots) (one of them impleaded as respondent no. 4 (hereinafter to be called as private respondents) who have earlier commenced the mining operation on the allotment of these plots by the RSMDC and to group the remaining 146 vacant plots in the delineated area in the blocks of 5 plots each and to allot them to the Khatedars of the land if they surrender their Khatedari rights and to entrepreneurs. It has also been prayed that the State of Rajasthan, Director, Mines and Mining Engineer (respondents no. 1,2 and 3, be directed to dispose of the applications received by them in pursuance of the gazette notification, Annexure 1 dated November 19,1981. On the request of the learned counsel for the parties, the cases being similar were taken together and arguments were heard for their final disposal. As such they are being disposed of by this common order.

(2.) THE facts may be narrated in short, as follows. THE Mining Engineer, Rajsamand (respondent no. 3) published notice Annexure 1 in the Rajasthan Gazette dated November 19, 1981 inviting applications for grant of mining lease for marble mineral for the are as situated in Rajsamand and Amet Tehsils on the terms and conditions mentioned therein the areas were divided into 181 plots of 100 x 100 square meters each. In pursuance thereof the petitioners submitted their applications for grant of mining leases for the various plots. One Rajendra Singh Mehta filed writ petition No. 2016/81 challenging the said notification Annexure 1. THE court was pleased to stay the operation of the notification by its order Annex. 1b, dated January 13, 1982, in all 2761 applications were received and no action was taken on the applications due to the sataly order. THE respondents no. 1 to 3 appointed RSMDC as their agent and granted working permission to it for undertaking mining operation in 65 plots for marble on certain conditions. Instead of commencing the work, the RSMDC allotted 35 plots to the said five private respondents. Finding that the aforesaid working permission given to the RSMDC did not financially benefit the Government, it withdrew it and took the said decision Annexure 2.

(3.) THE first question for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the petitioners had an efficacious remedy for getting the order Annexure 2 quashed ? A revision under section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (In short 'the Act') could be filed by the petitioners before the Central Government. THE first contention of the learned counsel for the petitions was that the writ petitions cannot be dismissed on this ground after they have been admitted. It is correct that about 10 writ petitions were admitted on December 7, 1989. THE orders admitting the writ petitions are not speaking orders. It cannot be said that this preliminary objection was over-ruled while admitting them. By their admission, the respondents are not deprived of taking this preliminary objection. THEy have specifically taken it in their replies. At the commencement of the arguments, aforesaid preliminary objections were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and in fact the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties centered round the aforesaid preliminary objections. In Hridaya Narain v. I. T. G. (9), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of having alternate remedy after hearing arguments at length on merits. Such is not the case here.