PRAKASH CHANDRA AGARWAL Vs. AMAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MUNSIFF and Judicial Magistrate, Bedi has moved this application Under Section 15 (2) of the. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, praying that proceedings for Contempt of Court be initiated against Amar Singh Parmar, Advocate.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this complaint are that on 27th June, 1980, a bail application was moved on behalf of the accused, Maharaj Singh. The matter was Under Section 366, IPC. According to the order-sheet dated 27th June, 1980, the accused, Maharaj Singh, was present along with his counsel and on behalf of the prosecution, the Assistant Public Prosecutor was present. The learned Magistrate for the reasons given in the order-sheet rejected the application for bail. On the proceedings of the Court, the counsel for the accused made an endorsement that the petitioner has not been heard. The learned Magistrate is of the opinion that the learned Advocate Shri Amar Singh Parmar for the accused, Maharaj Singh, had no authority to make such an endorsement on the Court file without the permission of the Presiding Officer. According to the A ) learned Magistrate this tantamounts to Singh Parmar was not at all justified in making that endorsement on the proceedings of the Court file. If Shri Parmar was not heard on the bail application, the only course open to Mm was to move an application duly supported by an affidavit and the matter could have been investigated. Be that as it may, the learned Advocate did make an endorsement on the court file. The question for consideration is, whether making an endorsement on the proceedings of the Court file that the petitioner was not heard tantamounts to criminal contempt of Court. To amount to criminal contempt of Court there must be a wilful action on the part of the petitioner to Undermine the dignity of the Court and the majesty of law. We have no hesitation in holding that by making such an endorsement on the proceedings of the Court file neither the dignity of the Court, nor the majesty of law was offended. The action of the Advocate was inappropriate, but it does not amount to criminal contempt of Court.

(3.) FOR the reasons stated above, we are firmly of the opinion that proceedings for criminal contempt of Court Under Section 15 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, should not be initiated against the Advocate for the accused. The petition filed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is accordingly rejected.