(1.) THESE three appeals can be conveniently disposed of by a single order as the only question involved in all the three appeals is the same namely, whether the right of preemption accrues on the sale of Khatedari rights in agricultural land under the provisions of the Rajasthan Preemption Act, 1966 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act of 1966') The suits instituted by the preemptors in all the three case were dismissed by the trial court. When First Appeal No. 104 of 1970 came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge, he noticed that there were two Single Bench decisions of this court taking conflicting views in the matter. In Prabhu Dayal v. Mahadeo Math 1972 WLN 455, It was held by Gattani J., as he then was, that a suit for preemption In respect of sale of Khatedari rights is maintainable. However, in civil revision petition No. 53 of 1959 Kishan Gopal v. Shivjiram and Ors., decided on January 20, 1969, Jagat Narayan J. as he then was dismissed summarily the appeal filed by the plaintiff preemptor on the ground that there can be no preemption of tenancy rights under the Rajasthan Preemption Act of 1966. S.N. Modi J. before whom these appeals came up for hearing, having noticed the aforesaid conflict of views, has referred this case to a larger Bench. The two other appeals, namely, First Appeal No. 96 of 1970 and First Appeal No. 14 of 1971, have, also been connected with First Appeal No. 104 of 1970.
(2.) SINCE the point arising in all the three cases is purely one of law we do not consider it necessary, to narrate the facts(SIC) each case -Suffice it to say that the plaintiff in all the three cases, instituted -suits for preemption In respect of transfer of Khatedari rights in agricultural land. The learned Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, upheld the contention raised on behalf of the defendants that no suit for preemption can lie in respect of sale of Khatedari right in agricultural land and dismissed the suits.
(3.) IT has not been disputed before us that the land In question falls within the ambit of the term 'immovable property'. It is also beyond dispute that Khatedari rights in respect of the land in dispute have been transferred and the right of the plaintiffs to preempt as coshares has also not been called into question. The point that has been canvassed before us, is whether transfer of Khatedari rights can be said to be transfer of ownership in immovable property. Mr. Lekh Raj Mehta, has urged that there need not be a transfer of absolute ownership. Even transfer of limited ownership gives rise to the right of preemption. He endeavoured to show by reference to the various provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (No. 3 of 1955) (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act of 1955') that Khatedari rights have all the necessary attributes of ownership, though there are certain restrictions placed on the rights of Khatedars His contention, in short, is the for giving rise to the right of pre -emption, it is 'sufficient if there is transfer of even a limited ownership on the other hand, Mr. M.M. Singhvi learned Counsel for the respondents, has contended that the right of preemption is a weak right and unless. It can be clearly spelled out from the provisions of the statute, it cannot be given effect to. His submission is that Khatedari rights are pure and simple tenancy rights. A Khatedar is not an owner of the land but he is only a tenant with certain privileges and therefore transferor Khatedari rights cannot give rise to right of pre -emption, as in case of such a transfer, it cannot be laid that there has been a transfer of ownership in immovable property.