MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE BUNDI Vs. KALU LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE eight appeals are directed against the judgment of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bundi. As Common questions of law are involved in all these appeals they are being disposed of by this single judgment.

(2.) THE brief facts of the cases, which are relevant for the disposal of these appeals are that the non-petitioners were running flour mills. THE non-petitioners did not get their respective licenses renewed after the expiry of the period. THE contention of the Municipal Committee is that the respondents have, thus, aviated bye-laws Nos. 1 and 13 of 1947. On a complaint filed on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bundi the Assistant Collector and Magistrate First Class, Bundi sentenced the respondents to pay fine and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for violating the bye-laws Nos. 1 and 13 of 1947. THE respondents feeling aggrieved against the orders of the learned Asstt. Collector and Magistrate First Class, Bundi filed appeals before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bundi praying that their conviction was against law and that it should be set aside. THE contention of the respondents was that bye-laws of 1947 have been repealed and the learned trial Magistrate erred in law in holding that these bye-laws were saved by Section 2 (b) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959.

(3.) ON behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bundi it has been contended that the Ordinance No. 4 of 1949 could not have created a vacuum and the bye-laws which were framed in the year 1947, could not be deemed to have been repealed by Section 4 of this Ordinance. It was also contended that Sec-tion 24 of the General Clauses Act saves these bye-laws and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that these bye-laws stood repealed by promul-gation of the Ordinance No. 4 of 1949. It was also contended that the license fee for running a flour mill is an impost and is as such, saved by virtue of Section 4 (a) of the Ordinance No. 4 of 1949. Reliance has been placed on Chief Inspector of Mines vs. K. C. Thapar (1), wherein at page 843, it has been held as under: - "the construction will give reasonable effect to sec. 31 (4) of the Mines Act 1923 and at the same time not frustrate the very salutary object of sec 24 of the General Clauses Act. ONe may pause here to remember that regulations framed under an Act are of the very greatest importance. Such regulations are framed for the successful operation of the Act. Without proper regulations, a statute will often be worse than useless. When an Act is repealed, but re-enacted, it is almost inevitable that there will be some time lag between the re-enacted statute coming into force, and regulations being framed under there-enacted statute. However efficient the rule-making authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable It is conceivable that any legislature, in providing that regulations made under its statute will have effect as if enacted in the Act, could have intended by those words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and re enacted (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later), the regulations will have to existence for the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and thus the re-enacted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the purpose be which induced the draftsmen to adopt this legislative form as regards the rules and regulations that they will have effect "as if enacted in the Act. " It will be strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that by becoming part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when the Act is repealed. ONe can be certain that that could not have been the intention of the legislature. It is satisfactory that the words used do not produce that result For if we apply the rule of harmonious construction, as has been pointed out above. S. 31 (4) does not stand in the way of the operation of S. 24 of the General Clauses Act. " A similar view was taken in Neel vs. State of W. B. (2 ).