BASUDEV Vs. DAMODAR LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -

(2.) IN this second appeal by the defendant-tenant two points have been argued on behalf of the appellant. It is contended in the first instance that sec. 2 (2) proviso (e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (which, hereinafter, will be referred to as the "act") is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of INdia and is, therefore, liable to be struck down. It is submitted that it is on account of the aforesaid provision that the defendant-appellant has not been given protection of the said Act. IN the second place it is contended that the finding of the learned District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur, that the plaintiff requires the room in question bonafide for his personal necessity is not sustainable on account of omission on the part of the learned Judge to consider that only a little before the service of notice of termination of tenancy, the plaintiff had let out other rooms in the building.

(3.) AS regards the fixing of the date as 1st June, in the impugned provision, it is true that no data has been placed before the Court, either by the learned Deputy Government Advocate or by the plaintiff-respondent as to why this particular date was fixed for the purpose of granting exemption in respect of new houses. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the Act was made on 28th November, 1950, and was published in Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 23rd December, 1950 from which date secs. 1 to 4 & 27 to 30 were applied immediately and it was provided that the remaining provisions shall extend to such areas in the State and shall come into force therein with effect from such date as may be notified from time to time by the State Government in the official gazette. The remaining provisions were extended to different areas in the State thereafter from time to time. It is not suggested on behalf of the appellant that the 1st June, 1961, was fixed with a view to benefit any particular class of persons or with any ulterior motive. It appears that some date had to be fixed for the purpose and in most of the towns in the State the remaining provisions were made applicable from 23rd December, 1950. It appears that the Legislature probably thought that the constru-ction undertaken after the promulgation of the Act may be completed in six months or so and consequently very likely with a view to encourage people to take up construction of new houses immediately after the promulgation of the Act, 1st June, 1951, appears to have been fixed for the purpose. In those circumstances it cannot be said that the classification on the basis of time, that is, the date selected, affords no rational basis. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection Balalbhau Manji vs. B. Nandanwar - F. B. (2) and State of Punjab vs. S. Kehar Singh (F. B ) (1) are altogether distinguishable. Consequently I am of opinion that the impugned provision cannot be struck down on account of fixing the date as 1st June, 1951. I am also unable to see how the fixing of period of seven years in the impugned provision would invalidate it or make it unconstitutional? On the other hand, it is only for the benefit of the tenant that after the expiry of this period the provisions of the Act would be applicable also to the new houses built after 1st June, 1951.