GIRDHARI Vs. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two writ petitions have been referred by a Learned Single Judge because he was of the opinion that the decision of another learned Single Judge in Harishchander Singh vs. Regional Transport Authority (1) requires reconsideration.

(2.) THE relevant facts are these. THE petitioner is one out of 17 existing operators on the Bikaner-Dungargarh-Sardarshahar route. Formerly there was no road between Dungargarh and Ratangarh. A new road was later on constructed and applications were filed by different persons for grant of permits over Bikaner-Dungargarh-Ratangarh route and over Bikaner-Dungargarh-Ratangarh-Churu route. THEse applications were published in the Gazette from time to time, and a meeting of the Regional Transport Authority was convened on 25-6-69 to consider them. Neither the petitioner nor any other person filed any objection against the grant of permits on these routes to the applicants in accordance with the provisions of sec. 57 (3 ). On the date of hearing the petitioner appeared before the Regional Transport Authority and filed an application that it could not grant any permit on the Bikaner-Churu route as it had not fixed the limit of permits as required under sec 47 (3 ). THE R. T. A. thereupon proceeded to fix the scope of both he routes. THE scope of Bikaner-Churu route was fixed at 5 permits providing 2 return services daily. THE scope of Bikaner-Ratangarh route was fixed at 5 permits providing 6 return trips daily THEreafter at the same meeting the R. T. A. considered the rival claims of the applicants for permits on these two routes. On the Bikaner-Churu route it granted 5 permits to respondent No. 2 to 6 of writ petition No. 1134/69. On the Bikaner Ratangarh route the scope of which was fixed at 5 permits it granted 3 permits to respondent No. 2 to 4 of writ petition No. 1135/69 as these 3 persons alone had applied for grant of permit on this route.

(3.) THE learned Judges proceeded to observe that even assuming that the section applies to the order in question it cannot be said that the petitioners had a specific legal remedy which would bar a writ of certiorari. "as laid down in A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil (9) by Chief Justice Chagla, specific legal remedy, which would bar a writ of certiorari can only mean that the petitioner must have a right to approach a court and he must have a right to a remedy if his case was just. Applying this principle, it cannot be said that the petitioners have a right to approach the State Transport Authority under sec. 64-A, and have a right to remedy if their case was just. . . . . . . . . . . . . In this case also, Sec. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act only deals with the power of the State Transport Authority to interfere with an order of the Regional Transport Authority and not with the rights of a party who is affected by the said order. A party may approach the State Transport Authority but he has no right to do so nor has he a right to a remedy because the State Transport Authority may refuse a remedy under this section. "