GULAM SINGH Vs. TH KARAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Jaipur District dated 31st May, 1954 dismissing the plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 13,000/ -.

(2.) THE main contention which has been urged before us is that the learned District Judge was in error in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation.

(3.) IT appears that in this case the Court of Wards admitted the plaintiff's claims to the extent of Rs. 5691/14/- without any future interest, vide Ex. P. 3. IT further appears that by arrangements between the parties the payment of the debt was to be made by instalments and in consequence of the arrangement, the Court of Wards made the aforesaid payments. The plaintiff continued requesting the Court of wards to make further payments till 18th April, 1951 vide Ex. P 18. In these circumstances when the plaintiff was seeking the satisfaction of his claim and had come to an arrangement with the Court of Wards a fresh cause of action arose to him in respect of the unsatisfied claim on the removal of the management of the Court of Wards. We may in this connection refer to a few cases. In Surnomoyee Vs. Shooshee Mokhee, (1) a sale under the Patni Regulation having been set aside and the patni-dars restored to possession, the zamindar sued them to recover the arrears of rent which had accrued before and during the time they were out of possession; the contention of the tenants that the claim was barred because the suit had not been brought within three years from the date when each instalment of rent fell due, was overruled, and it was held by the Judicial Committee that the cause of action accrued upon the reversal of the auction sale and the consequent revival of the obligation to pay the rent. " In Bassu Koer Vs. Lala Dhum Singh, (2) "a debtor agreed to convey certain property to his creditor and to set off the debt against part of the consideration for conveyance. A sale deed was executed, but a dispute arose as to whether it had been executed in accordance with the contract, Litigation was commenced by the debtor to enforce the agreement, but he was unsuccessful. The creditor then sued to recover the debt and was met by the plea of limitation. The Judicial Committee held that the time began to run only when the agreement became wholly ineffectual and that from that date a fresh obligation was imposed upon the debtor to pay his debt. " In Nrittyamani Dassi Vs. Lakhan Chandra Ben (3) "the plaintiffs commenced an action for declaration of their title to a share in certain properties and for possession. They, as proforma defendants, had supported the plaintiffs in an earlier suit in ejectment and had asked for a declaration that they too had a share in the property in suit. A decree was passed declaring them jointly entitled to a share and entitling them to possession to the extent of that share. The said decree was set aside on appeal on the ground that the said relief could not be given as between co-defendants, the suit itself not having been one for partition but for ejectment. The primary Court dismissed the suit as barred computing the period from the original dispossession. The Court of appeal doubted whether the case fell under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, but held that the decree which the plaintiffs had obtained as co-defendants in the previous suit, so long as stood undischarged, was susceptible to execution and it was not open to the plaintiffs to institute a fresh suit for the attainment of the very object which they had successfully attained in the previous suit. They held that during the time that decree was undischarged the plaintiffs' right to recover the property was suspended and they were entitled to a deduction of the period. } On an appeal being preferred the Judicial Committee dismissed the appeal observing that they concurred generally with the reason given by the Court of appeal, and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a deduction of the period during which they were litigating for their rights. " In Muthu Korakkai Chetty Vs. Madan Ammal and others (4) the principle of law was thus stated by Sadasiva Ayyar, J.- "whenever proceedings are being conducted between the parties bonafide in order to have their mutual rights and obligations in respect of a matter finally settled the cause of action for an application or for a suit the relief claimable wherein follows naturally on the result of such proceedings, should be held to arise only on the date when those proceedings finally settle such rights and liabilities. "