AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT RAJASTHAN PR Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are five writ applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution by which the validity of the Rules called the Rajasthan State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1959) has been challenged. As the questions of law raised by these petitions are common, we propose to dispose of them by a single judgment.

(2.) IT is necessary to state a few salient facts in order to understand the contentions raised in these writ petitions. The petitioners are the several holders of certain stage carriage permits on certain routes, and it is sufficient to state for our present purposes that these permits have not yet expired and would be current for some time to come. In exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 68-I of the Motor Vehicles Act (No. IV) of 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) under Chapter iva thereof, which was introduced into the Act for the first time by Act No. 100 of 1956, the State Government published a draft of the impugned Rules by a notification in the State Gazette dated the 9th December, 1959, in compliance with Sub-section (1) of Section 133 of the Act. This notification was issued, to use its own language, "for the information of all persons likely to be affected thereby", and notice was thereby given that the said draft would be taken into consideration on or after the expiry of seven days from the date of publication of that notice in the Official Gazette. It was further notified that

(3.) THESE applications have been resisted by the State. The submission of the State is that, according to law, it was not at all necessary to invite any objections before making the rules and that the only requirement was that the Rules should have been pre-published in accordance with the provisions of Section 133 of the Act and, that, in fact, was done, the Rules having been actually finalised after the expiry of a week from the date of the pre-publication of the draft rules. It was further contended in this connection that under Section 23 (5) of the general Clauses Act which was quite explicit and binding on all courts, once the rules, which were certainly purported to have been made in exercise of the power to make them after previous publication, were published in the official Gazette, that must be held to be conclusive proof that the rules were duly made and thereafter they could not be questioned at all. It is also contended before us that the Rules did not affect the bus operators at all and that they can have no legitimate grievance if they were finalised in the manner done. It was further contended that it was a matter for the Government to determine how much time should have been given by it for the submission of objections or suggestions and that it was hardly for the court to go into this question and that in any case the time given was perfectly adequate. It was also submitted in this connection that the introduction of Chapter IVA in the Act was a sufficient notice to everybody concerned, and that the Rules were merely procedural. Developing the argument on the same lines, it was further contended that Section 68-B of the Act of 1939 had an overriding effect and, therefore, the Rules as framed could not be refused effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IVA of the Act or in any other law for the time being in force. For all the reasons mentioned above therefore it was equally strenuously contended on behalf of the State that the grievance raised by the petitioners was without any substance, and the writ applications deserved to be dismissed.