DEO DUTT SHARMA Vs. COLLECTOR AJMER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a writ application by Shri Deo Dutt Sharma, Chairman Municipal Council, Ajmer, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) IT is common ground between the parties that the petitioner took charge of his office of Chairman on 25. 4. 59. In October, 1959, a few members of the Municipal Council signed a motion of no-confidence and presented it in the office of the Collector, Ajmer, who was appointed by the State of Rajasthan as the prescribed authority to whom a motion of no-confidence could be submitted. Thereupon, he convened a meeting for the consideration of the said motion on 27. 11. 59. On the next day, i. e. , 28. 11. 59, he issued a memo informing the Municipal council that the petitioner should be deemed to have vacated his office with effect from 27. 11. 59. The validity of this order was challenged by the petitioner by Writ Application No. 459 of 1959 before this Court. That application was decided op 13. 4. 60. IT was found by this Court that 3 out of 18 members who had voted against the petitioner on 27. 11. 59 were suffering from disqualification on that date and therefore their votes were not valid. Hence, it was declared that the resolution dated 27. 11. 59 regarding want of confidence in the petitioner was not passed by the valid votes of a majority of the whole number of (32) members and therefore the petitioner should not be deemed to have vacated his office. After the said decision of this Court dated 13. 4. 60, the petitioner resumed the office of Chairman. On 3. 8. 60, 15 members of the Municipal Council again submitted a written notice to the prescribed authority (Collector, Ajmer) expressing their intention to make a motion of no-confidence in the petitioner. The prescribed authority, therefore, fixed 1st September, 1960, as the date for the consideration of the said motion at the municipal office, Ajmer, at 11 A. M.

(3.) THUS, the term 'meeting' in all these sub-sections refers only to the meeting which is held on the date fixed for that purpose and the notion of continuation of that meeting to another date is clearly ruled out. Moreover the law does not contemplate any appeal against the decision announced in the said meeting and therefore ordinarily it would be final on that very day. This Court may in its extraordinary jurisdiction entertain a writ application in a certain case, but simply because that decision is declared by this Court to be correct or wrong it would not extend the date of the meeting of the municipal board to the date of the decision of this Court. In those types of cases where the decision of the Court results in a fresh appointment or a fresh removal or dismissal, it would be a different matter, but this is not a case of that kind. In the instant case, the very decision of the Court was that the petitioner would be deemed to continue in office from 27. 11. 59. If the contention which is now raised by the petitioner is accepted, then it would mean that there was a break in his office and he was rejected as a chairman on 13. 4. 60. This Court cannot however reelect a chairman who is legally ousted from his office. It can only set aside his ouster if it is illegal and so the petitioner would be deemed to have continued in office even after 27. 11. 59 though he may not have actually worked for a short time. Again, if the argument of the petitioner is allowed, then it is likely to create a strange anomaly. Take, for instances a case in which a vote of no-confidence against a chairman is declared not to have been carried out on 1. 1. 59. Another motion of no-confidence is therefore tabled after the expiry of 6 months and it is carried out on 1. 10. 59. Suppose further that some aggrieved member files on 1. 4. 59 a writ application in respect of the decision taken at the first meeting and it is contended that some valid votes were wrongly rejected by the prescribed authority and that if they were also counted against the chairman, the motion would have been held to be carried out. Now, if the decision of this writ application is given by the court on 1st November, 1959, can it be urged with any justification that the meeting of 1. 1. 59 should be taken as notionally extending upto 1. 11. 59, the period of six months should be computed from 1. 11. 59, and the motion carried out on 1st October, 1959, should be ignored. It need hardly be stressed that in a democratic body, a chairman remains in office only so long as he enjoys the confidence of the majority of its members. That is also the general scheme of the present Act. Sec. 72 (9) puts a limited restriction on the right of the members to bring a motion of a vote of no-confidence in the chairman in the circumstances detailed therein and it gives a corresponding limited protection to the chairman to remain in office for a period of six months from the date of the last meeting, if the motion of no-confidence fails on that date. It would not be proper for either party to stretch its plain meaning to suit their convenience. It is a wellknown principle of judicial interpretation that when the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then they should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense and the words themselves should be taken as best declaring the intention of the legislature. So interpreted, the date of meeting in the present case would be 27. 11. 59 and not 13. 4. 60 and the period of six months should be computed from the former date.