UTTAMCHAND Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an 'application in revision filed by accused Uttam Chand and Trilok Chand who were convicted by the Special Excise Magistrate (First Class) Jaipur by his order dated 19th May, 1959 under sec. 54 (a) of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950. They filed an appeal which was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City and since it was dismissed on 6th July, 1959, they have approached this Court.

(2.) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment pronounced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City is not a valid judgment in law and, therefore, it is prayed that it should be set aside and that the learned Judge should be directed to re-hear the parties and give a fresh judgment. IT is pointed out by the learned counsel that arguments in the appeal were heard by Shri P. L. Agarwala who was Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City on 8. 6. 1959. He was transferred to Jodhpur and, therefore, he handed over charge of his office to Shri Sampat Rai Mathur on 24th June, 1959. After arriving at Jodhpur Shri P. L. Agarwala signed the judgment on 28th June, 1959 and sent it by post to Shri Sampat Rai Mathur who pronounced it on 6th July, 1959. IT has been argued that Shri P. L. Agarwala having handed over charge of his office at Jaipur on 24. 6. 59, he had no jurisdiction left to deliver the judgment, that Shri Sampat Rai Mathur who pronounced the judgment never heard the arguments or applied his mind to the questions of facts and law involved in the case and that he had no authority to pronounce a judgment written and signed by his predecessor.

(3.) IN Surendra Singh vs. State of Utter Pradesh an appeal was heard by two learned Judges of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) on 11. 12. 52. Thereafter one of the learned Judges dictated the judgment, on behalf of himself and his brother Judge. He signed every page of the judgment including its end but did not date it. He then sent it to the brother Judge but unfortunately, before the judgment could be delivered, the learned Judge who had written out the judgment, expired and the said judgment, was delivered by the other learned Judge on 5. 1. 1953. IN these circumstances it was observed by their Lordships after referring to the relevant provisions of Cr. P. C, as follows : "in our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the Court intimated' to the parties and to the world at large by formal pronouncement or delivery in open court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. . . . . . . . . It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or innmated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open court. But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the Court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the Court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion, Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts. Those are not the judgments either, however heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open Court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court. That is what constitutes the judgment. "