KAJOR Vs. PRATAP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a regular civil second appeal by the plaintiff Kajor against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Bhilwara dated the 12th August, 1958, in a suit for possession relating to certain agricultural land.

(2.) THE land in dispute is described in the plaint as Khasra No. 1746 measuring four bighas and six biswas situate in village Rehad, Tehsil Shahpura. THE plaintiff's case was that he had been in peaceful possession of the suit land and that he was dispossessed thereof by the defendant on Baisakh Sudi 15, Svt. 2008 corresponding to the 21st May, 1951. THE present suit was, therefore, filed in the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Shahpura on the 3rd December, 1954, when the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, (No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to the Act of 1951) was in force.

(3.) THE two cases which appear to deal with the distinction between items Nos. 10 and 12 are Pancha vs. Chatra (5) and Mina vs. Board of Revenue, Rajastban (6 ). But, it is contended on the side of the respondent, that they do not afford any clear or definite guidance and with all respect this submission does not seem to be entirely without force. I would, therefore, prefer to interpret the various items having regard to their plain language putting the natural meaning on the words used therein. And when I do so, I cannot help saying that the language, of these items is not at all precise and happy and they would be found to be overlapping each other in some cases. So fat as item No. 12 is concerned, it inter alia provides for a suit for compensation and such a suit would be outside the ambit of the other two items. In other words, a suit for compensation must be filed within a period of three years from the date of cause of action, and if it is not so filed; it would be barred by limitation. A suit under this item may be filed even against an erring landlord. Similarly item No. 11 would appear to specifically provide for a suit for ejectment wherein land has been duly let out to others. But apart from these limitations, all the three items likewise seem to me to cover a suit against a trespasser, although items Nos. 10 and 11 specifically mention the word "trespasser" while item No. 12 does not do so; but that, in my opinion, hardly makes any difference. Again, item No 12 mentions the person by whom the suit is to be brought, while the other two items do not make any reference to the person who may bring a suit thereunder. In this connection it was vehemently submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that item No. 10 is intended to cover a suit by a landlord while item No. 12 refers to a suit by a tenant. To my mind, such a distinction cannot be maintained in view of the current of authority in this Court. See Bhura Lal vs. Thikana Badi Sadri (3) in which it was definitely laid down that it would be open to an under proprietor to bring a suit against a superior proprietor under item No. 12 and the earlier case of Nawalji vs. Jagji (4) was distinguished and held to be confined to the facts of that particular case, and it was further made clear that the decision in that case was not intended to lay down any general rule that item 12 was limited in its application to a suit by a tenant only. Again, there is nothing in the wording of item No. 10 by which the operation of this item may be necessarily limited to a suit by a landlord and by no other person. A suit by a landlord or a person deriving title or possession from him or by a tenant may, broadly relying on the language of items Nos. 10 and 12 ( provided that it may not specifically fall under item No. 11 ) fall equally within the four walls of either item No. 10 or item No. 12 and in so far as they do so, they would be found to overlap each other. "the difficulty in properly interpreting these items is not a little due to the circumstance that the substantive provisions with reference to which these items have been enacted were not incorporated in the Act of 1951. This difficulty is further accentuated because while the period of limitation fixed for suits under item No. 10 is 12 years, a far lessor period being three years has been provided under the other two items and we would not have been faced with any such difficulty if a uniform period of limitation had been prescribed under all these items. Be that as it may, I have no hesitation in saying that a suit by a person in peaceful possession of an agricultural land for ejectment of a trespasser who has dispossessed the former may fall not only under item 12 (or even under item No. 11 in a conceivable case) but may also fall under item No. 10, and where such over-lapping of the items should occur. I am definitely inclined to hold the view that the larger period of limitation should be held to apply on the principle that where there is any reasonable doubt as to whether a longer or shorter period of limitation applies to a given suit, the court should favour the interpretation which would advance the remedy rather than the one which would hamper it. Reference may be made in support of this view to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Jeth Mal vs. Amb Singh (7), where the principle is accepted that where the language of a law relating to limitation is not precise and is of doubtful import, such law may be construed equitably or reasonably, that is, such construction thereof may be adopted which favours the right to sue rather than which bars that right.