UNION OF INDIA Vs. THEKEDAR BHOJRAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and is directed against the order of the District Judge of Bikaner passed on the 13th of August, 1957.

(2.) IT relates to a suit instituted by the respondent Bhojraj, a contractor in Bikaner, against the Union of India, the defendant and appellant before us, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 11,623/11/-, said to be due on the basis of certain contracts dated 29th October; 1954, and 12th November, 1954 The defendant before filing any written statement in the suit presented an application under sec. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act alleging that the subject-matter in dispute in the said suit was covered by clause 24 of an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. The petition presented was not supported by any affidavit and only clause 24 of the Agreement in question has been quoted therein. The order sheet shows that various adjournments were obtained by the defendant for producing all the necessary documents, but the Arbitration Agreement itself was never produced at my stage, and the Court was left to speculate as to what the terms of the Arbitration Agreement were so as to cover the subject-matter of the suit. We will presently refer to clause 24 of the Arbitration Agreement as quoted in the defendant's petition to see what meaning can be conveyed to the Court on the terms of the clause itself. On the presentation of the petition, the defendant claimed that it was ready and willing to appoint an arbitrator both before and after the suit, and, therefore, the proceeding in. question should be stayed in order to enable the parties to have the matter decided by an arbitrator nominated by the General Manager of the Railway Administration in terms of the said arbitration clause referred to in the petition. The plaintiff objected to the application for stay, and contended that the defendant had persistently neglected and disregarded any reference to arbitration even within the terms of the alleged arbitration clause. He pleaded that in consequence of the defendant's attitude, it had become impossible for the plaintiff to wait indefinitely for the settlement of his claim, and was compelled to seek the assistance of the Court. The plaintiff, therefore, repudiated the version of the defendant that it was ready or willing to do every thing necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration proceeding, either before or after the commencement of the suit. IT was also pleaded by the plaintiff that there were certain claims which did not form the subject-matter of the Arbitration Agreement at all. He therefore, prayed that the application for stay of proceedings should be rejected. The objection petition of the plaintiff as distinguished from that of the defendant was duly supported by an affidavit also.

(3.) THE other point is a matter which affects the conduct of cases in subordinate courts, and the tendency to procrastination discern able in many cases on account of unnecessary adjournments often granted by some courts even in interlocutory matters. We desire to point out that this practice which unnecessarily prolongs litigation must be seriously discouraged. In this particular case the suit was filed on the 12th of July, 1956. On the 26th of September, 1956, the defendant presented the application under sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act. On 5th November, 1956, the plaintiff filed his objection to the above application of the defendant. THE Court instead of hearing the parties immediately on that point allowed the defendant to take an adjournment, and the case was adjourned for arguments on 12th December, 1956. On the 12th of December the lawyer for the defendant again applied for time and the Court adjourned it to 28th January, 1957. On 28th January, 1957, the defendant again applied for time,- and 19. 3. 57 was fixed for hearing arguments in the matter of the application under sec. 34. On the 19th of March, 1957, the case was adjourned again to 20th of April, 1957. On the 20th of April, the Presiding Officer appears to have gone on leave and then the case was fixed for argument in the above matter on 13th July, 1957. THEn on 13th July the arguments were heard, but orders were reserved until the 23rd, though actually the orders were passed on the 13th of August, 1957, after two other adjournments. It is an unfortunate state of affairs that interlocutory matters of this kind should have dragged on for such a long period and the Court should have so easily acceded to prayers for adjournment at the instance of the defendant instead of insisting that the matter should be disposed of at an early date.