AMARDEEP SINGH Vs. COLLECTOR AJMER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE five appeals raise inter alia a common important question of law and the learned counsel for the parties have desired that the question of law arising in these appeals may be decided in the first instance.

(2.) THE various appellants claimed to be grantees from the holder of the Masuda estate. THE Government of the former Ajmer State having issued a notification under Sec. 4 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act (No. III of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) declaring that the estate of Masuda shall vest in the State Government, the various appellants claiming to be grantees and consequently intermediaries filed written statements of their claims before the Compensation Officer. THEse claims were ultimately considered by the Compensation Commissioner. Before him, the Collector Ajmer opposed the claims of all the appellants on the ground that the grants in their favour have not been recorded in the record of rights and there had been no mutation, in their favour. It was contended that under sec. 65 of the Act, entries in the record of rights should be considered conclusive proof of the status of a person claiming to be an intermediary and no evidence of any kind should be allowed and considered against the entries in the record of rights. THE Compensation Commissioner relying upon a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, held that the entries in the record of rights are conclusive and irrefutable and the appellants cannot challenge their correctness. He, therefore, refused to go into the evidence led by the various appellants and dismissed their claims for compensation. THE appellants have filed the present appeals.

(3.) A consideration of sec. 20 of the Act also lends considerable support to the above interpretation of sec. 65 of the Act. It empowers the Compensation Commissioner to entertain questions in respect of rights, title and interest in the estates of the intermediaries ; to hold inquiries and to record decisions. Obviously, inquiries of this nature must involve the collection of all relevant evidence and materials, their proper scrutiny and consideration and presuppose a competence of the inquiry officer to arrive at independent conclusions. There is nothing in the language of sec. 20 of the Act to suggest any restrictions on the powers of the Compensation Commissioner to hold inquiries in the manner indicated above. An acceptance of an interpretation of sec. 65 of the Act as raising conclusive presumptions is wholly inconsistent with independent inquiries by the Compensation Commissioner under sec. 20 of the Act, and should be avoided on the accepted principle of interpretation of reconciling various provisions and harmonising them. The Compensation Commissioner attempted to reconcile them by observing that sec. 65 of the Act laying a rule of evidence must be kept in view while determining questions of title under sec. 20. This, in my opinion is over-simplification and will make inquiries under sec. 20 a mere farce. , On a consideration of the elementary and fundamental ideas associated with inquiries as indicated above, I see no adequate justification to concur in the interpretation of these sections adopted by the Compensation Commissioner an,d to hold that the Compensation Commissioner in the exercise of his powers under sec. 20 is merely to record his decisions only on the basis of entries in the record of rights. The proper way of reconciling these two provisions, in my opinion, is to treat sec. 65 as creating rebuttable presumptions only and to hold that the Compensation Commissioner is competent to hold proper inquiries under sec. 20, and to reach independent conclusions, keeping of course in view the rebuttable presumptions arising from entries in the record of rights. The Deputy Government Advocate suggested that sec. 20 of the Act contemplates those cases where under the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, the record of rights are not prepared and it is only in respect of these estates that the Compensation Commissioner has been authorised under sec. 20 of the Act to inquire into and decide questions of title. The language of sec. 20 of the Act does not permit of such a narrow interpretation and I have no hesitation in holding that it contemplates inquiries into all cases irrespective of the fact whether there exists or does not exist a record of rights.