DEEPA RAM Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These writ petitions assailing the declaration Under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894( in short "the Act") published vide notification dated 5.2.08 involve common questions and therefore, the same were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

(2.) The relevant facts in nutshell are that the State Government issued a notification dated 7.4.07 under Section 4(1) of the Act, whereby 1424.81 hectares agriculture land situated in Revenue village Beethnok, Lakhasar, Chak Khuri, Gurha, Chak Madhogarh in colonisation tehsil Kolayat No. 1, district Bikaner was proposed to be acquired in favour of the company Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Corporation Limited ("RSMM") at its own costs, for excavation of the mineral lignite in the mining area covered by the said land. The persons interested were directed to submit their objections against the proposed acquisition of the land in writing within a period of 30 days of publication of the notification before the Land Acquisition Officer. Admittedly, none of the petitioners submitted their objections. However, a few objections were raised by the agriculturist of village Gurha. After consideration of the report made under Section 5A, the declaration Under Section 6 of the Act was issued by the State Government vide notification dated 5.2.08 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 20.2.08. A notice Under Section 9 of the Act was issued to the petitioners and they were asked to hand over the possession of the land . At this stage, the validity of the land acquisition proceedings is challenged by the petitioners herein on various grounds before this Court by way of these writ petitions.

(3.) It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the land acquisition proceedings initiated for the benefits of RSMM, a company, at its own costs without complying with the mandatory provisions of Part VII of the Act and Rule 4 of the Rules of 1963 are void ab initio and deserves to be quashed and set aside for this reason alone. In this regard, the learned Counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2008 1 SCC 728. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that before issuing the notification Under Section 4 of the Act, the State Government is under an obligation to form an opinion after due consideration of all relevant aspects that the land needs to be acquired for the public purpose or a company. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that before issuing the notification, even the availability of the mineral was not ascertained by the State Government and therefore, the notification issued without forming any opinion as to the actual need of the acquisition is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the excavation of the mineral lignite can only be done under the provisions of Mining & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder. It is submitted that for the purpose of excavation of the lignite a prospective license was required to be obtained by the company for coming to the conclusion that the lignite is available in the land sought to be acquired. It is submitted that in absence of the prospective license and the investigation thereunder, the land could not be acquired on the assumption that the lignite exists underneath. It is next contended by the learned Counsel that the report Under Section 5A after enquiry was submitted to the State Government by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation, who is not authorised to undertake such exercise. It is submitted that the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation is the authority different than the Sub Divisional Officer and therefore, the notification dated 2.5.87 issued by the State Government authorising Sub Divisional Officer- cum- Land Acquisition Officer to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act cannot validate the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation acting without jurisdiction. It is submitted that even subsequent notification dated 18.1.94 issued by the State Government is not a general notification Under Section 3(c) of the Act, authorising all Assistant Commissioner, Colonisation to act as a Collector in the matters of land acquisition. It is submitted that under the said notification the powers of the Collector has been conferred upon the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner only in respect of the acquisition of the land for Department of Colonisation. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned Counsel that in absence of a specific notification issued by the State Government authorising Assistant Commissioner Colonisation to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act , the inquiry conducted Under Section 5A of the Act stands vitiated. Lastly, learned Counsel urged that the State Government has even not applied its mind to the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation in terms of the provisions of Section 5A so as to form an opinion regarding the alleged public purpose or the suitability of the land for the purpose it is sought to be acquired and therefore, the notification Under Section 6 issued by the State Government deserves to be quashed and set aside for this reason also. In this regard, the learned Counsel has relied upon decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Darius Shapur Chennai, 2005 7 SCC 627 and in Nandeshwar Prasad and Ors. v. U.P. Government and Ors., 1964 AIR(SC) 1217.