GIRVAR SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the validity of judgment dated 10.05.2000 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur in Original Application No. 37/1998, whereby, the Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the petitioner against order of removal dated 20.11.1993 and confirmed vide order dated 13.04.1997 by the appellate authority.

(2.) ADMITTEDLY , after taking into consideration the procedure laid down in the rules, the services of the petitioner were terminated and during litigation the impugned judgment was passed by the Tribunal in the fifth round of litigation. Earlier, number of times, the matter came before the Tribunal and was remanded back from time to time. Last order of the Tribunal was passed on 13.05.1996 in original application No. 49/1995, in which, order of the appellate authority was challenged mainly on the ground that three ingredients contained in Rule 27 of the CCA Rules have not been following while passing the said order and no order regarding payment of subsistence allowance in the intervening period from 09.04.1985 was passed. The Tribunal vide order dated 13.051996 disposed of the original application with direction to the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal keeping in view the three ingredients contained in Rule 27 of the CCA Rules.

(3.) AFTER hearing both the sides, so also, having perused the finding given by the learned Tribunal, it emerges that while deciding the original application the Tribunal opined that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is commensurate with the offence committed by him and the Tribunal cannot substitute its decision to the decision of the Disciplinary authority and appellate authority; and, further, a person belonging to the Defence Establishment has to maintain the discipline so that the entire establishment may function effectively. While observing the above finding, the Tribunal held that the order of disciplinary authority and appellate authority awarding the punishment of removal is just and proper.