ALCOBEX METALS PVT LTD Vs. COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is against the judgment dt. 30.6.1993 passed by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer in respect of assessment year 1988 -89. The order relates to rejection of rectification application moved by the petitioner for rectifying the mistake which is alleged to be apparent from record.

(2.) THE brief facts and circumstances in which the present case arises as noticed in the order passed by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal dt. 15.12.1992 are that there was a works contract between appellant dealer and the B.H.E.L. for the fabrication of Cupro -Nickle -Tubes. The appellant dealer did the job work in respect of the fabrication of the above tubes and supplied the same to the B.H.E.L. prior to 22.4.1988. The dealer in fabrication of the said tubes used Nickle valued Rs. 2,47,987/ -. The other commodities used in execution of the said works contract were supplied by the B.H.E.L. for whom the job was executed. The assessing authority held that in execution of the works contract property in Nickle worth Rs. 2,47,987/ -passed on to B.H.E.L. and it amounted to sale of Nickle by the petitioner -dealer. He, therefore, levied tax on the sales of Nickle at said amount and interest u/s. 11B on the additional demand. He also levied penalty u/Ss. 16(1)(i) and 16(1)(e) amounting to Rs. 37,500/ -. The amount on account of penalty u/s. 16(1)(e) included penalty for violation of the provisions in respect of Nickle as well as in respect of sale of other electrical goods as raw -material. By its order dt. 15.12.1992 the Tribunal had rejected the plea of the assessee that transfer of property in goods used in execution of works contract about fabrication of any goods prior to 22.4.1988 was not eligible to tax because fabrication works was not included in definition of works contract prior to 22.4.1988. Tribunal was of the view that definition of works contract was always there, relying on the Judgment of this Court in M/s. Sood Enterprises's case in D.B. Civil Writ No. 1698/89 decided on 18.11.1990, according to which two definitions of works contract during the intervening period, Sections 2(e) and 2(u), were in existence. There was no hiatus and tax could have been levied, even prior to that in respect of goods involved in execution of works contract. However the Tribunal. deleted penalty u/s. 16(1)(i) and tax on the packing material. Penalty u/s. 16(1)(e) was also deleted in respect of turn over of Nickle in question but sustained penalty u/s. 16(1)(e) in respect of sale of electrical goods as raw -material. Thus it partly allowed the appeal of the assessee.

(3.) IN the first instance it needs to be clarified that while considering rectification application distinction has to be kept in mind between the case where consideration of conceivably two rival opinions is required to be evaluated before reaching the conclusion about the alleged error in the order which has already come into existence on the one hand and the case where for the purpose of finding the existence of any error, mere reference has to be made to different provision of law whose meaning is clear and unambiguous. In the former case consideration of opinions or contentions on contentious issues does not provide foundation for exercise of jurisdiction for rectification inasmuch as the mistake which is to be discerned and discovered by farming opinion by weighing rival views on which conceivably there may be two opinions cannot be a mistake apparent from the record. However in the latter case, merely because a long chronology of events has to be seen or number of provisions of the statute are to be seen for the purpose of consideration whether the conclusion reached is in consonance with the plain meaning of the law flowing from the reading of the statute itself would not make it any less a mistake apparent from the record. Mistake apparent from record is definitely something wider than mistake which can be pointed out as typographical error or inadvertent, or clerical mistake, which every Tribunal has inherent powers to correct. A mistake which is not to be discovered after a elaborate discussion of rival contentions but is clear from chronology of events or plain meaning of statutory provisions or conclusion has been reached without considering the relevant provisions of law do fall within such mistake which can be corrected by rectification. Therefore the question of this nature raised in this case cannot be examined and decided without having looked at the relevant provisions themselves which in my opinion the Tribunal has apparently failed to do.