(1.) AS to who is in possession of the land in dispute is basically a question of fact. Such was the view expressed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. After taking note of the factual realities and also the scope of the writ jurisdiction, the writ petition was dismissed. It is the dismissal of the writ petition which has led the appellants to prefer this appeal under clause 12 of the Letters Patents.
(2.) ORIGINALLY the dispute was between respondents No. 5, 6, 7 and Puran. Puran has since died. His legal heirs figure as appellants, the further fact is that Puran had sold the land in question to number of persons. This aspect of the matter was noticed by the learned Single Judge. The individuals to whom the land had been sold had also appeared before the learned Single Judge as interveners. The appellants and the interveners assail the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that the questions of fact could not be examined in writ jurisdiction. They also assailed the view expressed by the J&K Special Tribunal whereby the Tribunal appreciated the entire material on the record and recorded a positive finding that it was Ishar Chand, Sain son of Kaka, and Gian Chand S/o Kalu respondents who were the persons in possession and therefore, entitled to the benefit of sections 4 & 8 of the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the scope of the writ jurisdiction is limited. The findings of fact recorded by the subordinate authorities are normally not to be interfered with. We are of the opinion that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in this regard is a view to which no exception can be taken. It can be safely concluded that the learned Single Judge rightly refused to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. In this regard it would be apt to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others (AIR 1955 SC 233) wherein it has been held as under:
(3.) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellant/writ -petitioner submits that the scope of section 21(2) of the Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 1976 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) under which the original power was exercised by the J&K Special Tribunal was also not in accordance with the para -meters fixed under section 21(2) of the Act. It is urged that the Tribunal in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction could not up -set the findings of fact recorded by the Subordinate authorities. It is submitted that this jurisdictional error which was required to be corrected by a learned Single Judge in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is precisely this argument which has been addressed again in this appeal. Before examining the scope of the power which the Tribunal exercises under section 21 (2) of the Act it would be apt to notice the relevant provisions itself. Section 21(2) of the Agrarian Reforms Act 1976 reads as under: