BASHIR AHMAD Vs. STATE AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Sh. Rahmat Ali, Food Inspector, Jammu Municipality, +n Nov. 16, 1979 accosted Bashir Ahmad, Petitioner herein at Shaheedi Chowk, Jammu when he was carrying a drum of milk for sale and demanded a sample from him Prosecution case was that the petitioner on hearing it became furious and lifted an iron rod from a nearby halwai shop of Banarsi Dassand hit it to Food Inspector resulting injury to him. Food Inspector fell unconscious and was removed to hospital It was further alleged by the prosecution that the petitioner prevented Food Inspector from taking sample of Milk and thus violated provision of sub-section (d) of section 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (for short Act hereinafter) A separate case under sections 332/334, R.P.C. was also registered at Police Station city Jammu on the same day on the report of Hamid Masih, Sanitary Supervisor, against the petitioner and Shah Mohd. and Mst Fatima and a challan under sections 332/34, RPC was produced against the above said three persons in the Court of City Magistrate, Jammu. A complaint under section 16 of the Act was produced by Barkat Ali Food Inspector against the petitioner herein and both these cases were tried by the learned City Magistrate, Jammu. Mst. Fatima died during the trial of the case. Trial court convicted Shah Mohd. and Bashir Ahmad under sections 3 32/34, RPC and sentenced both of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month Bashir Ahmad was also convicted in the other complaint under section 16 of the Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months and a fine of Rs. 100.00. In appeal learned 1st, Addl. Sessions Judge found the conviction under section 3 32, RPC not maintainable against the petitioner and Shah Mohd. H. acquitted them but maintained the conviction and sentence of petitioner herein under section 16 of the Act. Being dis satisfied with these orders of the courts below, petitioner has come up in revision before this Court.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the record before me. Mr. J.P. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the facts brought on record at the most constitute a specific offence under Ranbir Penal Code in which petitioner has been acquitted and these facts do not, in any manner, involve the petitioner with the commission of offence under the provisions of the Act. According to him there is evidence on record that the petitioner did not prevent Food Inspector from taking sample and main allegation against him was that he assaulted the Food Inspector. Learned counsel for the respondents have, however contended that both the courts below have found the petitioner to have violated the provisions of section 16 of the Act and on those facts this Court should reopen the case.

(3.) Generally speaking, concurrent findings of fact arrived at by two courts below are not to be interfered with by the High Court in absence of any special circumstance or if same are perverse, in any manner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to fact which have been discussed in detail by both the courts below and in this revision petition. I think, T should restrain from interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by those courts, I also do not find any circumstance for coming to different finding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on certain points and according to him the petitioner is entitled to be granted benefit of the provisions of Probation of Officers Act. In this regard he has pointed out that litigation started in the year 1979 and it would be horrible for the petitioner to suffer imprisonment after a lapse of about ten years and after suffering mental agony for such a long period. His second plea in this regard is that the petitioner and the Food Inspector are neighbours and they have close relations and because of some misunderstanding whole mishap took place. In support of his contentions he has referred to Supreme Court authorities, AIR 1981 S.C. 175 and AIR 1988 S.C. 2111.