AMAR NATH JAIN Vs. S SHER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is plaintiffs civil Second Appeal whose suit for ejectment against the defendant in respect of a house was decreed by the trial court but has been dismissed on appeal by the lower appellate court. The plaintiff died during the pendency of this appeal, and his legal representatives were brought on record.

(2.) THE plaintiff claiming to be the owner of the suit house on the basis of a decree which he obtained in a pre -emption suit, sought ejectment of the defendant on two grounds : one, that the house being in a dilapidated condition, he wanted to rebuild it, and two, that the defendant had committed three defaults of two months each in payment of rent within a period of eighteen months. The defdt. in his written statement not only denied the derivative title of the plaintiff qua the suit house, but also denied that the house was required by him to be rebuilt. He further denied that he had committed any default in payment of rent. The trial court on consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit house for rebuilding, though he found against the plaintiff on the issue of defaults and consequently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal, the lower appellate court upset the finding of the trial court on the issue of reasonable requirement for rebuilding and dismissed the plaintiff suit.

(3.) THE only point which has been canvassed in this appeal by the learned counsel for the parties is ; whether or not the plaintiff reasonably required the house for the purpose of rebuilding. The trial court, as already pointed out, held that as the house was an old and dilapidated one, and the plaintiff had adequate means to rebuild it, and had also made all preparations for the purpose, his requirement was reasonable. The lower appellate court on the contrary held that the house even though old was yet in a good condition which did not require immediate demolition and rebuilding. It was further of the opinion that the plaintiff had filed the suit to carry out his expansionist design  of selling the house after ejecting the defendant, and earn profit thereby as he had been doing in the past. In any event, the other condition of comparative public benefit, not being satisfied, the plaintiff, according to it, was not entitled to the relief claimed. Whereas Mr. Thakur has contended that the view taken by the lower appellate court cannot be supported on evidence, Mr. Sehgalâ„¢s contention is that the view taken by the lower appellate court was the only view which could have been taken in the circumstances of the case. In any event, argued the learned counsel, the requirement of rebuilding being strictly personal to the plaintiff, it perished with his death, and the right to sue did not survive, adding, that even if it survived there was no evidence to show that the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff had the capacity and capability  to rebuild.