(1.) AGGRIEVED by a direction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (shortly "the wages Authority") for payment of delayed wages, the petitioner appealed. The appeal was heard by the learned District Judge, Poonch. By his order dated 11 -11 -1975, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal, hence this revision.
(2.) THE Wages Authority made the impugned direction on 18 -3 -1975 under Section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act (shortly "the Wages Act;). In accordance with the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Wages Act an appeal against such direction can be -preferred within a period of 30 days from the date thereof. The petitioner filedâ„¢ the appeal on 18 -4 -1975. The learned District Judge declared, the appeal to be time -barred after repelling the contention of the petitioner that, in computing the period of limitation prescribed under Section 17(1), the day on which the direction was made and the time spent in obtaining copy of the direction was liable to be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. For this, the learned District Judge drew support from a decision of this Court in Tara Chand Vs. Ghulam Rasul (1973 -JKLR 913). In that case, the question arose whether Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked -to condone the delay in filing an appeal arising under the Wages Act. This Court answered the question in the negative. Incidentally the Court made the following objections: -
(3.) THE effect of this section is that if a special or local law provides for a separate period of limitation, then the provisions of the Limitation Act excluding section 3, section 4, section 9 to 18 and section 22 shall not apply wholly or in part, unless such special or local law expressly so provides. This is precisely the principle reflected in the observations of this Court. The principle cannot be extended to section 12 which would be applicable unless otherwise provided by such special or local law. There is no such provision in the Wages Act. It necessarily follows that section" 12 would be applicable to the appeals arising under the Wages Act. So viewed the appeal in the present case was within time. The view to the contrary expressed by the learned District Judge is wholly erroneous and unsustainable in law.