MUNSHI RAM Vs. BELI RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application arises out of an order passed by the trial court of the Sub Judge Kathua holding that the present suit is cognizable by the Civil Court.

(2.) THE plaintiff brought a suit alleging that he was the occupancy tenant of the land in question, having purchased the occupancy rights from the defendants, and prayed for a declaration to this effect and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. The trial court was of the view that on the allegations made in the plaint the case was cognizable by a civil court and not by the revenue court. In revision the point raised before the learned single judge was that as the suit fell within the four corners of S. 85(3) (a) of the J&K Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court was clearly barred. The learned single judge after hearing the counsel for the parties has referred the following point for our decision: - "Has the civil court jurisdiction to entertain a suit when a prayer for permanent injunction is added to the prayer for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is the occupancy tenant of the land."

(3.) WE have heard counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts in support of his contention that the present suit being clearly covered by the first group of S. 85(3) (a) of the Tenancy Act was not cognizable by the civil court. On the other hand the counsel for the respondent has relied on other decisions to show that since the suit was also for a permanent injunction it could not be entertained by a revenue court which was not entitled to give a relief with respect to the prayer for injunction. In order to determine this question it will be necessary to analyze the provisions of the Tenancy Act which in our opinion appear to be different from the provisions of the Tenancy Act which were the subject matter of interpretation by the Allahabad High Court. S. 85(3) (a) of J & K Tenancy Act runs thus: "The following suits shall be instituted in and heard and determined by Revenue Courts and no other court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any such suit might be instituted - (a) suits by a tenant under S. 7 -A(l) or otherwise, to establish a right of occupancy or by landlord to prove that a tenant has not such a right." Counsel for the petitioner seeks to bring his case within the ambit of cl. (a) referred to above inasmuch as according to him it is in substance a suit for establishing a right of occupancy against the defendant. It is well settled that in order to determine the question as to which court would have jurisdiction to decide the suit, the court has to look into the allegations made in the plaint and not in the written statement. In the plaint the allegation made by the plaintiff does not constitute a prayer for declaration of the status of an occupancy tenant simpliciter, but the plaintiff avers that he had purchased right of occupancy from the defendant on the basis of which he seeks to base his title. Thus even on the allegations made in the plaint it would appear that a clear question of title is involved, namely, the validity of the transfer of the occupancy rights by the defendant to the plaintiff. Therefore such a suit does not come prima facie within the purview of S. 83(3)(a) (Supra). Even assuming, however, that the right to question the purchase of the right of occupancy by the plaintiff amounted to a right to establish the right of occupancy and is covered by S. 85(3) (a) of the Tenancy Act the question still remains whether or not there is any provision in the Tenancy Act which empowers the revenue court to grant relief for a permanent injunction. It is well settled that no court is to infer an implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. Unless there is a specific provision barring the jurisdiction of the civil court, the same would not be said to be ousted. This principle was recently laid down in a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1968 All. 369. Furthermore in Magiti Sasamal V. Pandab Bissoi and others. AIR 1962 SC 547 the same principle had been laid down by the Supreme Court in the following words: "It is true that having regard to the beneficent object which the legislature had in view in passing the Act its material provisions should be liberally construed. The legislature intends that the disputes contemplated by the said material provisions should be tried not by ordinary civil courts but by tribunals specially designated by it and so in dealing with the scope and effect of the jurisdiction of such tribunals the relevant words used in the section should receive not a narrow but a liberal construction. While bearing this principle in mind we must have regard to another important principle of construction, and that is that if a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. As the privy Council has observed in Secretary of State Vs. Mask & Co., 67 Incl. App 222 at p. 236: AIR 1940 PC 105 at p. 110." "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied." "If the respondents contend that the jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with such a civil dispute has been taken away by S. 7 (1), we must enquire whether S. 7(1) expressly takes away the said jurisdiction or whether the material words used in the section lead to such an inference or the scheme of the Act inescapably establishes such an inference. The relevance and materiality of both these principles are not in dispute." In the case which was being considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court S. 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act had laid down suits lying in five different categories which were not cognizable by a civil court. Their Lordships pointed out that all the five categories had to be carefully analyzed in order to see whether or not a particular suit falls within four corners of those categories before the jurisdiction of a civil court could be ousted. Similarly their Lordships held that any dispute regarding the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant was beyond the ambit of the categories mentioned in the said Act.