AHAD MIR Vs. MAHDA BHAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a defendants first appeal. It arises out of a final decree, passed by the Munsiff at Sopore in a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. The relief for accounts was valued in the plaint at Rs. 1000/ - under S. 7 (iv) (f) of the Court -fees Act. A preliminary decree was passed on 30 -7 -1958 and was followed by a final decree on 14 -3 -1959. The final decree awarded a sum of Rs. 3203/ - to the plaintiff against the defendant. The defendant who is aggrieved by this final decree has come up in appeal to this court.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the plaintiff -respondent has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal in this court. He has argued that the amount at which the plaintiff valued the relief sought by him in the plaint should determine the forum of appeal and not the amount which was finally decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the defendant -appellant urged, on the other hand, that it is the amount for which a final decree is passed in a suit for accounts that should determine the course of appeal and not the original valuation which the plaintiff chose to put upon the plaint. This original valuation is said to be merely a tentative valuation and that the real and correct value is the amount for which the final decree is passed.

(3.) SECTION 7 (iv) (f) of the Court -fees Act gives an unfettered discretion to the plaintiff to value the relief sought by him at an amount of his choice. The value so adopted by him will be the proper value for purposes of court -fees. Under S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the same will be the value for purposes of jurisdiction also. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the value put upon the plaint under S. 7 (iv) (f) is only a tentative value and not the real value. There does not appear to be any warrant in the Court -fees Act for such a. proposition. A perusal of the various provisions, of the Court -fees Act discloses that in a considerable class of important suits, as for example, suits for land, it is not the real value of the subject -matter of the suit that is made the basis of valuation for purposes of court -fees. In some cases the value is fixed; in other cases a particular mode of computation is prescribed for ascertaining the value for purposes of court -fees. And in yet another class of cases the plaintiff is given the discretion to adopt his own valuation. Suits falling under S. 7 (iv) (f) of the Court -fees Act belong to the last category. There is nothing in the Court -fees Act to indicate that the amount at which the plaintiff values his relief in an account suit is only a tentative value. On the other hand, a true construction of 5. 7(iv)(f) appears to be that the amount at which the relief sought by the plaintiff is valued in the plaint in an account suit is the only valuation of that suit for purposes of court -fees, and according to S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act that is the only value for purposes of jurisdiction. It, therefore, appears to be all too unnecessary to ascertain what the learned counsel for the appellant would call "the real value" of the relief sought in the plaint. We are concerned with the value which the statute recognizes and not with the so -called "real value". Furthermore, if we are to go by the real value and not by the value stated in the plaint, the entire process of litigation including appeals is likely to get involved in needless difficulties and complications. For, if we presume that the real value of the relief sought by the plaintiff in an account suit is the amount which may ultimately be found by the court to be due to the plaintiff, we shall be able to know that final amount only after the pronouncement of the last court of appeal. It is obvious that determination of the court of first instance or the court of first appeal cannot possibly be made to depend upon the final adjudication of the amount by the court of the last resort. It is also possible that an appeal against the preliminary decree may lie to one court of appeal, but the appeal against the final decree may lie to a higher court of appeal. There is also the possible anomaly of a defendant who appeals against the final decree being entitled to prefer one forum of appeal, whereas the appealing plaintiff may have to resort to a higher court of appeal. These anomalies cannot be got rid of unless we adopt the value stated in the plaint as the value for purposes of court -fees and jurisdiction, and as the value for determining the forum of appeal. The propriety, convenience and advantage of making the value of a suit a stable factor instead of a shifting quantity cannot be exaggerated. Any departure from this simple rule is bound to create difficulties of the nature indicated above. It is possible consistently to follow in all cases the rule that the value stated in the plaint should determine the forum of appeal. But if the rule is that the amount of the final decree should decide the forum of appeal, that rule cannot consistently be adopted in all cases and in all circumstances. Suppose the plaintiff has valued the relief in an accounts suit at Rs. 10,000/ -and a final decree is given only for Rs. 2,000/ -. If the amount of the final decree is to decide the forum of appeal, the defendant who prefers the appeal must be held to be entitled to resort to the District Court in appeal. But if the plaintiff in that case wants to appeal, he will have to go to the High Court. But it is argued that if the amount awarded by the final decree is less than the value stated in the plaint, the latter should decide the forum of appeal. It is however stated at the same time that if the amount of the final decree is larger than the value put upon the plaint, the former must determine the course of appeal. We find it difficult to find one consistent principle running through these propositions. Either the value stated in the plaint must be the uniform guide or the amount of the final decree must be the only criterion. We are unable to see either consistency or principle in saying that in certain cases the valua -tion in the plaint must be adopted as the basis and that in certain other cases the amount awarded by the final decree must form the basis. No doubt, a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Kalu Ram v. Hanwant Ram, AIR 1934 Lah 488, has held that in suits for recovery of money on unsettled accounts the value of the subject -matter of the original suit is the value as given in the plaint unless it is enhanced by an adjudication of the court that a higher sum is due in which case it is the latter sum which becomes the value on which court -fee is computed and which therefore is the proper value for purposes of jurisdiction. With utmost deference, we find ourselves unable to accept this view.