RAM RATTAN VERMA Vs. STATE OF J&K

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners submit that so far as Executive Officers in the Notified Area Committees and the Town Area Committees are concerned, they should be treated at par with each other. For this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it is urged :

(2.) It be seen that the Executive Officers so far Notified Area Committees are concerned, they are being appointed under the J&K Municipal Act of Samvat- 2006, and so far as Executive Officers of the Town Area Committees are concerned, they are appointed in terms of the Town Area Committee Act. The two Executive Officers are therefore appointed under different statutory provisions. If this be the situation, and if they are not being given the same grade, it cannot be said that they have been discriminated in a manner which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. More often functions of two posts may appear to be same but there may be difference in degrees in the performance of their duties.

(3.) The Supreme Court in the case of Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi v. Union of India, 1962 AIR(SC) 1139 and State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, 1963 AIR(SC) 913 was held that the abstract principle of Equal pay for Equal work has nothing to do with equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 of the Constitution of India. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India, 1982 AIR(SC) 879 the Supreme Court taking note of the Preamble to Constitution of International Labour Organisation which recognised the concept of "equal remuneration for work of equal value" came to a conclusion that the concept of equal pay for equal work is deducible from Articles 14, 16 and 39(d). This concept assumed concrete shape when in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India, 1993 3 SCT 137 the Court observed that "....... although the doctrine of equal pay for equal work" does not come within Article 14 of the Constitution as an abstract doctrine, but if any classification is made relating to the pay scale and such classification is unreasonable and or if unequal pay is based on no classification, then Article 14 will at once be attracted and such classification should be set at naught and equal pay be directed to be given for equal work. In other words where unequal pay has brought about a discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution, it will be a case of 'equal pay for equal work' as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution. If the classification is proper and reasonable and has a nexus to the object sought to be achieved, the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' will not have any application even though the persons doing the same work are not getting the same pay. In short, so long as it is not case of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution, the abstract doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' as envisaged by Article 39(d) of the Constitution, has no manner of application nor is it enforceable in view of Article 37 of the Constitution. Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P., 1986 1 SCC 637 may be cited as a case of 'equal pay for equal work' as envisaged by Article 14 and not of the abstract doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work'. Where differentiation is sought to be justified on ground of dissimilarity of responsibility, confidentiality and relationship with public there may be some rational nexus. Thus in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others v. Union of India and others, 1988 AIR(SC) 1291, where the stenographers (Grade-1) who were attached with officers sought parity with the pay scale of stenographers attached to the joint Secretaries and Officers above that rank, the claim was negatived. It was observed :