STATE OF J&K Vs. GH RASOOL BHAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the JUDGMENT of learned Single Judge dated 10th July, 1996 passed in SWP No. 950/95. It has been averred in this LPA that the respondents filed the aforementioned of their service under SRO 64 of 1994 on the basis of having served continuously as daily rated workers for a period of 240 days. It is an admitted fact that the respondents were engaged as daily rated workers, but without formal appointment orders, and after a few months they were not allowed to continue on the ground that the Executive Engineer, who had asked them to work, had no powers to engage casual labourers. However, the writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge after receiving objections from the otherside. By way of the impugned JUDGMENT, writ was allowed, disengagement of the respondents was quashed and direction was given to the appellants to re -engage them mainly on the ground that the writ petition squarely was covered by Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the disengagement of the respondents was deemed as retrenchment without notice and against the mandate of Section 25 of the aforesaid Act. In this appeal, two pleas have been raised. First, that the writ petitioners (respondents) had filed the writ petition under SRO -64 of 1994 for regularisation and the relief claimed was that they should be allowed to continue and their services be directed to be regularised. According to the appellants, it was nobodys case before the learned Single Judge that the respondents claimed to be the workmen under that particular Act on the ground that their retrenchment was effected without notice. Thus, they were disengaged in violation of section 25 of the aforesaid Act. Secondly, it was contended, that there was no basic appointment. The Executive Engineer had no powers to engage anybody as casual labourer.

(2.) HEARD learned counsel for parties in detail. Mr. Mujtaba Hussain, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted detailed arguments. While admitting the ground realities that the relief given by the writ -court does not commensurate with the pleadings of the case. He has mainly put his thrust on the point that the writ court, while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can mould the relief. It is a fact that the respondents did not claim that they were employees of a corporation of that they were workmen within the meaning of relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. They have not pleaded that they were retrenched or that their disengagement amounted to retrenchment. In short, they did not claim to be governed by the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act, nor did they seek the reliefs under that Act. They have come under ordinary service Law to be more precise, simply under SRO 64 of 1994 for regularisation of their services. It is true that the writ -court on filing of objections by the appellants came to know that their service had been disengaged only after a few months and the learned Single Judge granted the relief to the respondents under Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that the case of the respondents had not been dealt with by the appellants under Section 25 (F) of the aforesaid Act.

(3.) WE have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced before us. We feel two difficulties in dealing with this appeal. While perusing the record, it was found by us that the writ petition was allowed without formally admitting it to hearing. There is no dispute about it. Our view is that without formally admitting the writ petition to hearing, the relief given in the petition is hardly enforceable in law. It is true that a writ petition can be disposed of at the initial stage, but the point involved is whether it can be disposed of without formally admitting it to hearing. We have come across a case of similar nature entitled "Union of India and other vs. Daya Ram" decided by the Apex Court (Civil Appeal No. 7409 of 96), it has been held in the aforesaid JUDGMENT that: "Without admitting the petition to hearing, it is difficult to see how enforceable orders directing the respondent to a writ petition to do a certain things can be passed upon a proceeding which, in express terms, it stated to (See SLJ 1997 page 155).