STATE OF J&K Vs. S DARSHAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil second appeal is directed against the judgment, and decree of the learned District Judge Jammu dtd. 30 -10 -1978 where -by he has confirmed the Judgment and decree of the Sub Judge (CJM) Jammu dated 30 -9 -77.

(2.) IT appears that the respondent has brought a suit before the trial court for the recovery of Rs 2, 359/ -which he claimed as dues from the Government on account of having served the Government. He had joined the police Department as Jr. Grade Sub Inspector somewhete in 1940 and retired from the services on 10 -11 -1984. He is said to have again been taken in C1D department and in the year ,1961 -69 while posted as Dy. S. P, SID, poonch, he had reported about the activities of some ante national elements who were close to the then Chief Minister Mr. G. M. Sadiq. Names of those persons are mentioned by him in the plaint about whose activities he had reported to the then Chief Minister. On account of this he is said to have incured displeasure of the authorities and because of this his ACRS were spoiled in disregard of the rules. On account of this he could not cross the efficiency bar on 16 -11 -1969. Plaintiff -respondent on the account is said to have suffered loss of Rs 1710/ - The other claim made by the respondent was in respect of Rs 649/ - as Traveling expenses which were due to him but not paid for which he had served a notice also to the state. The suit was contested and issues were framed, Both the courts concurrently found the claim of the respondent herein as true and accordingly his suit was decreed for the said amount after appreciation of evidence.

(3.) MR . H. L. Parihar appearing for the appellant has raised only one point in this second appeal. His contention is that the suit of the plaintiff was barred under the law of limitation, therefore decrees of the courts below are liable to be set aside. He has referred to ArticlfS 7 and 73 of the Limitation Act and contended that either of these two articles were governing the suit of the respondent. The suit under both the articles was barred by Limitation on the day on which it was instituted. 5. Articles 7 relates to the limitation for recovery of wages of a household servant, artisan or labourer which can be recovered within one year from the date when the wages accrue due. This article has no application to the facts of the present case. Respondent was neither household servant, nor artisan nor labourer. He was in the service of the state and his rights were protected by statutory rules. Therefore, contention of Mr. Parihar must fail in this regard. 5. Article 73 of the Limitation Act provides that wages not otherwise expressly provided for by this schedule can be recovered within three years when the wages accrue due. This article also will not be attracted to the facts of this case, because in relation to a public servant who has a statutory right to claim salary and who is to cross efficiency bar for earning increments cannot be said to be a labourer or domestic servant so as to claim wages at the sweet will of his master. 6. Respondent has claimed payment of the amount which was legally due to him under statutory rules governing his conditions of service which rules had emanated from a source known as the constitution of the state Article 73 relates to a person who has no protection of statutory rules. Limitation in the present suit is nowhere provided in the schedule attached to the limitation Act. Therefore the suit would be governed by Art. 119 of the 1st. Schedule of the Limitation Act. It provides that when the right to sue accrues a claim can be preferred within six years for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule. The therefore petitioner could have brought the suit within six years from the date when the claim accrued to him. The cause of action according to the plaintiff -respondent had accrued to him in November. 1969 and September, 3968 and the suit was filed by him on 8 -1 -1973. The suit was brought within less than six years from the date of accruing of right to the plaintiff. The suit of the plaintiff was not therefore barred. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore is to be rejected as being devoid of force. No other point was raised before me. The appeal is therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.