(1.) AN exparte award was passed by the Labour court on April 26, 1991 in favour of the petitioner and against respondent No.3 whereby the petitioner was re -instated in service with all past benefits including the payment of back wages. It appears that the respondent No.3 felt aggrieved of the passing of the exparte award and accordingly moved an application for its setting aside. On this application being made, the Labour court issued a notice to the petitioner and in the meanwhile stayed the execution of the award till the next date before the Labour court, i.e. 27th April 1994. That was done on 4.4.1994. It is against this order dated 4.4.1994, the petitioner has filed this petition seeking inter -alia the relief of issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the aforeside order and a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent Labour Court from proceeding further in the matter.
(2.) THE contention of Mr. P.N. Goja, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that in view of section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the proceedings pending before the Labour Court stood concluded on the publication of the award dated 26.4.1991 in Government Gazette of 22nd Oct. 1992. According to him, the Labour Court had been rendered functus officio consequent upon the publication of the award in the Government Gazette and at the expiry of 30 days from the date of the said publication and that, therefore, it had no jurisdiction whatsoever after that period to entertain an application for setting aside the exparte award or to take any step in that direction. Mr. Goja has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal etc. reported in AIR 1981 S.C. 606. It is admitted that the award in question was passed exparte against respondent No. 3. It is also admitted that respondent No.3 had moved an application for setting aside the exparte award. The only point which is required to be determined in this case is as to whether the Labour court had the jurisdiction to entertain the application for setting aside the exparte award or not, and that too after the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of award in Government Gazette. The answer to the question is indeed simple. Section 20 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which is relevant for our purpose reads as under. - "20. Commencement and conclusion of proceedings........... (3) Proceedings (before an arbitrator under Section 10 -A or before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal (b) shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the (reference of the dispute for arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be (c) and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S.I7 -A)". Section 17 and Section 17 -A (in so far as it is relevant) read as under: - "17. Publication of reports and awards: - (1) Every report of a Board or Court together with any minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration award and every award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit. (2) Subject to the provisions of section 17 -A, the award published under subsection (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever". "17 -A. Commencement of the award: -(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17".
(3.) THE argument of Mr. Goja that the words "....... such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded........." should be construed to mean that the labour Court becomes functus officio is wholly devoid of any substance. Mere conclusion of proceedings in a Court or Tribunal does not render it functus officio in so far as the question of setting aside an exparte award/order is concerned. It is no doubt true that the conclusion of the proceedings does bring to an end the litigation between the parties in the forum where the proceedings had been pending and were concluded on a particular day. But that by itself cannot be interpreted to mean that, thereafter the forum has no jurisdiction to the either set aside its exparte award/ order or to review the same, if the power of review is provided in the statute.