LAWS(J&K)-1973-5-1

NARSINGDAS NARGIS Vs. BANSI LAL

Decided On May 05, 1973
Narsingdas Nargis Appellant
V/S
BANSI LAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application on behalf of the petitioners for quashing proceedings taken against them for an offence under S. 500 of the Ranbir P. C. on the basis of a complaint filed by one Bansi Lal in the Court of the Sub -Judge Judicial Magistrate Reasi The petitioners allege that the complaint filed by the respondent does not disclose any offence under S. 500 and the prosecution of the accused would amount to unnecessary harassment and abuse of the process of the court.

(2.) THE complaint was placed before me, and it appears that the complaint has taken serious exception to a news item published in the weekly Chand -an Urdu paper whose editors are the petitioners. The complainant is a clerk in the Tehsil Education Office at Reasi and has been working in that capacity for eight to nine years. The news item published in the said paper disclosed that the complainant had been working as a clerk in the Tehsil Education Office for a large number of years and had oppressed and harassed his subordinate staff. The object of the publication appears to have been to agitate for the transfer of the complainant from Reasi. The exact words used in the impugned news item are as follow: - The alleged defamatory statement published .in the. Chand issue of 5 -7 -71consists of five parts: 1) that the complainant is a clerk in the Tehsil Education office at Reasi, 2) that .he has been working in this capacity for 8 to nine years, 3) that there has been a serious public agitation for transfer of the complainant, 4) that the respondent has been exercising strict vigilance which amounts to oppressing and harassing the concerned staff and 5) that it is not proper in the interest of administration to keep an official at one place for such a long time. The complainant has himself mentioned in paragraph (1) of the complaint that he is a clerk in the Tehsil Education office and has been working there for about 8 -9 years. Thus the first part of the allegation made by the accused appears to be true even from the recitals in the complaint itself. As regards the other part which relates to public agitation, that clearly falls within the purview of a fair comment and cannot be said to be defamatory in any sense of the term. The sheet anchor however of the complainant is that the petitioners used the words Kafia Tang which amount to an imputation with an intent to harm the reputation of the complainant. The accused has not suggested what was really meant by using the words Kafia Tang because these words can be interpreted in various ways. These words might indicate that the complainant exercised such strict vigilance over his subordinate staff that they felt harassed and oppressed. The expression also may mean that the complainant was bent on teasing the concerned staff of the department. Reading the accusation as a whole, it seems to me that the main object and intention of the accused appears to have been not to malign the complainant but to seek his transfer by bringing the fact to his long stay at Reasi to the notice of the higher authorities. Before an offence under S. 500 of the Ranbir P. C. can be said to be committed, it must be proved affirmatively by the prosecution that an imputation was made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of a person.

(3.) IN the instant case I am unable to find any word in the news item from which an inference can be drawn that the accused had either the requisite intention or knowledge to harm the reputation of the complainant. On the other hand the case of the petitioners clearly falls within the first and second Exceptions to S. 499 of the Ranbir Penal Code which run thus: First Exception. - It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Second -Exception. - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. It is manifest that whenever a person accepts Government service or a public office, he must try to imbibe the spirit of toleration and forbearance so as not to be carried away by emotion and sentiment and get provoked by the slightest criticism of his conduct in the discharge of his public duties. He should not be too hyper -sensitive so as to feel hurt by any and every imputation that is made against him, but should try to stand up to any fair comments that are made in the interest of public good, even though the comments may not be palatable to the Government, official. I am fortified in my view by the observations of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh V. State of Punjab, (1956) SCR 476, 482 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: - "Public men in such position may as well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them rather than given importance to the same by prosecuting the persons responsible for the same." In Seymour v. Butterworth, 176 E.R. 166, 168, 169, Cockburn C. J. observed as follows: - "Those who fill a public position must not be too thick skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were unreserved and unjust; yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood for a time." Similarly in Kelley vs. Sherlock, (1879) 5 QBD 1 Bramwell B. observed as follows: - "Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept an attack as a necessary though unpleasant, appendage to his office." Again in the Queen v. Sir Robert Carden, 5 QBD 1, 8 Cock -burn C. J. observed as follows: - "It is true that a comment upon given facts, which would otherwise be libellous, may assume a privileged character because, though unjust and injurious yet being founded on facts not in themselves libellous, it is a comment which any one is entitled to make upon a public man." In Purushottam Vijay v. State, AIR 1961 M.P. 205, a Division Bench of the M.P. High Court laid down various tests to determine what in a particular case would amount to a fair comment. The first test laid down by their Lordship was that the facts mentioned in the publication should be substantially true. The second test was that the comments should be fair as being inspired by a genuine desire on the part of the writer to serve the public interest; and thirdly that the criticism even if called for by the facts should be in public interest and not actuated by private spite. I fully agree with the tests laid down by the Division Bench of the M. P. High Court in the case (Supra). In that case also serious allegations were made against a Minister. Their Lordships held that the publication did not exceed the limits of fair comment. To the same effect is a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Vishan Sarup V. Nardeo Shastri, AIR 1965 All. 439, 441 wherein their Lordships observed as follows: - "A newspaper editor, therefore, acts within his legitimate sphere when he offers criticism of what he considers and bonafide believes to be for the good of the community. In order to pass the test of fair comment the publication must be free from malice and made bonafide and in public interest. Mere exaggeration or inaccuracy in matters of detail does not make a comment unfair so long as what is expressed therein is materially true and for public benefit." In a previous decision of the same High Court in Municipal Board v. Ganesh Prasad, AIR 1952 All. 114 Bind Basni Prasad J. held, almost in similar circumstances, that impugned publication did not amount to defamation. Applying the principles of the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the present case, I am convinced that the publication referred to above in the issue of the Chand dated 5 -7 -71 cannot be said to be defamatory in any sense of the term so as to attract the provisions of S. 499 of the Ranbir P.C. The editor does not appear to have transcended his limits of fair comment and fair criticism in order to serve public interest. The complainant who is serving as a clerk in the Tehsil Education office had undoubtedly been stationed at one place for a period of more than eight years and the accused thought in good faith that public interest required that he should now be transferred so that he may not develop vested interests at Reasi. The mere fact that the accused used the expression Kafia Tang does not show that the accused was actuated by any personal vendetta against the complainant, a fortiori there is absolutely no allegation against the accused that he bore any animus against the complainant.