UNION OF INDIA Vs. JASWANT RAJ KOTWAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THERE is a delay of 141 days in filing the appeal. It is stated that the judgment was delivered by the learned District Judge, Bhaderwah on 24 -07 -2002 and the applicants came to know about this judgment when received notice in an execution application on 23 -12 -2002 at New Delhi. It is further stated that copies were applied on 29 -01 -2003. The applicants/appellants further explained intervening period between 23rd December, 2002 to 29th January, 2003 as utilized in ascertaining the facts with regard to exparte proceedings taken against them. That after collecting the record from various places, the same was handed over along with certified copies of the judgment and decree to the Central Government Standing Counsel in preparing the appeal, who filed it on 20 -03 -2003.

(2.) THE respondents, on the other hand, in their objections submitted that the notice of the appeal filed before the District Judge, Bhaderwaha was served on the applicants herein, but only SDM, Bhaderwah caused his appearance and contested the appeal filed by the non -applicant herein. That the applicants have not been able to explain the delay from 23 -12 -2002 up to 29 -01 -2003 when applied for certified copies, as to how the above period was utilized.That the application for condonation of delay is neither bonafide nor the delay has been explained satisfactorily and, thus, stated to be not legally sustainable.

(3.) THE Apex Court in Judgment Today 1998 Vol.7 SC 21 has observed that the period of limitation cannot be extended and delay condoned only on equitable grounds. Where sufficient cause is not shown, delay cannot be condoned. It is further observed where limitation is allowed to be passed without taking proper care, the explanation must be for the period pertaining to the date of limitation. The Supreme Court, in a judgment reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276, has observed as under: 'Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious.'