PRITAM SINGH Vs. STATE OF J AND K

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER has preferred this petition in alleging that in response to the advertisement issued by the respondents for filling up the post of Teacher/Guide, Rehbar -e -Taleem in the Government Primary School, Chakwa, he also applied for the post. It is further stated that another notification subsequently came to be issued by respondent -4 inviting application for 3rd post in all Government Primary Schools under the Rehbar -e -Taleem Scheme as Teacher/Guide, Rehbar -e -Taleem. The petitioner also applied for the said post.

(2.) THE sole grievance of the petitioner is that his name was not considered and included in the list of eligible candidates by respondent -5 on the ground that the petitioner has been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ramban, for offence under Section 304, part -II RPC, though his conviction and sentence has been stayed in an appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. It is submitted that the non -consideration and non -inclusion of the name of the petitioner in the list of eligible candidates for the post of Teacher/Guide, Rehbar -e -Taleem, is arbitrary and contrary to the Scheme and, therefore, petitioner sought the indulgence of the Court by issuing a direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to treat the petitioner to be eligible in pursuance of the notification issued by the respondent -4 and also consider, select and appoint him as such in the Government Primary School, Chakwa, as he possesses better and higher merit than the other candidates, who possess only 10+2 qualification.

(3.) AS against suspension of conviction and sentence in the case referred to above by Mr. Thakur, the Apex Court, looking to the legal position and all aspects including the ramifications of keeping the conviction in abeyance, held as under : 'The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellant court admits the appeal filed in the challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter.'