(1.) THIS petition had been filed for quashing order No. SRTC/ DGM/ F -17/108 dated 1 -2 -1992 issued by respondent No. 3 Whereby the petitioner, who was working as a Fitter in J&K S.R.T.C., was placed under suspension. The grounds taken by the petitioner in his petition are as under: -
(2.) THROUGH the returns filed by respondents the ground taken in the petition have been refuted. This has been done in a routine manner, without substantiating pleas which could in fact rebut the grounds under law. The points taken, in the light of stand by the respondent, are discussed as under:
(3.) ON a bare reading of this sub -rule it becomes clear that the person competent to place an employee of the corporation under suspension must be either the appointing authority or any authority under which the appointing authority works or any other authority empowered by the corporation in this behalf. This answering respondents have admitted that it is the Managing Director of the Corporation who is the Chief Executive and who is the appointing authority. Their stand is that the suspension was brought to the notice of the Managing Director and the same was duly confirmed by him. Admittedly respondent No. 3 is neither the appointing authority of the petitioner nor is anything on record to show that he was empowered to pass such an order. He can in no case happen to be the superior officer of the appointing authority. On that analogy he did not had the jurisdiction to pass the said order. What Mr. Salathia argued and what has been pleaded in ground No. 3 of the objections is that a post -facto confirmation was obtained from the Managing Director. This argument does not come to the rescue of the respondents for two reasons one that no amount of confirmation can ever validate an order which was passed by an officer who was not competent to do so, second, that there is nothing before the Court to suggest that even post -facto confirmation was sought. I may hasten to retreat that even in cases of clear proof with respect to obtaining of post -facto confirmation, the order would not be a valid order. This is because rule 143 expressly provides as to who are the persons who are competent to pass an order of suspension. Law relating to jurisdiction of orders, in my opinion, has to be interpreted on straight jacketed parameters. An order comes into existence when it is issued. So in the present case we are concerned with the validity otherwise of the order as was passed on 1.2.1992. The law is very much clear that an order passed by a person who is not competent to do so is a nullity and cannot stand. This ground is so strong that no room is, left for digressing upon other grounds. However, I find these grounds also to be some relevance. So in a touch and go manner I shall be dealing with those also.