MOHD RAMZAN BHAT Vs. CUSTODIAN GENERAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole point urged in support of this appeal was that the learned single Judge was in error in holding that the authorities below viz., the Custodian and Custodian General were right in holding that the appellant's application under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir, State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 2006, (shortly 'the Act) was barred by limitation. In order to appreciate the argument, it will be necessary to state a few facts. The appellant is in occupation of an evacuee house situated in the city of Srinagar, The house was declared as evacuee house and a notification was issued accordingly on 15-1956. The appellant filed an application for restoration of the house under Section 8 of the Act on 5-8-1969. The Custodian inter alia rejected the application on the ground that it was barred by time. The Custodian General upheld this finding in revision filed on behalf of the appellant. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the order rejecting his application. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition inter alia on the ground that it was extraordinarily belated and the authorities below were right in dismissing the same as time barred.

(2.) The appellant's contention before us was that the judgment of the learned single Judge is erroneous. For this, he relied upon the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, Sub-section (2) reads as under:- "Any claim under Sub-section (1) shall be preferred by an application made within thirty days from the date on which the notification was issued or the demand requiring surrender of possesion was made by the Custodian : Provided that the Custodian may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded, entertain the application even if it is made after the expiry of the aforesaid period."

(3.) The submission on behalf of the appellant was that since he is in possession of the house, time would start to run against him from the date the demand for surrender of possession was made and since no such demand was ever made, the application for restoration could not be held to be time barred, On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the application ought to have been filed within thirty days from the date of the notification and since the appellant had not done so and instead he had filed the application about fourteen years after the notification was issued, it was manifestly barred by limitation. Oh these rival contentions the question arises, whether the time starts running against a person in possession from the date of the notification or from the date he is asked to surrender the possession.