AMRIT NEHRU Vs. USHA NEHRU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal, which should have been normally heard by a Single Judge is before us on a reference made by Anand J. to resolve the conflict between the views taken by this court on the interpretation of the expression "during the proceeding" occurring in Section 30 of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1980, hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. Even though the order passed by the court u/s 30 is not appealable u/s 34 of the Act, yet an important question of law having arisen, we shall treat the appeal as a revision and dispose of it as such. The appellant will hereinafter be, therefore, referred to as the petitioner.

(2.) THE petitioner, the husband, on 18 -6 -1980 brought a petition u/s 11 of the Act for annulment of his marriage with the respondent in the court of District Judge, Srinagar. After the respondent had appeared in the court through her counsel on 3 -11 -1981, she made an application u/s 30 on 11 -11 -1981, claiming litigation expenses to the tune of Rs. 2,000/., and maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 500/ - per month, alleging that she had no independent source of income and that petitioner, her husband, was drawing a salary of Rs. 1400/ - per month as a Government employee. This application was resisted by the petitioner. Consequently, both the parties led evidence on it, and the learned District Judge after considering the same, granted a sum of Rs. 600/ - by way of litigation expenses and also granted maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 300/ - per month in favour of the respondent, by his order dated 27 -4 -1980; the order for maintenance to take effect from the date of the filing of the main petition u/s 11. This order has been assailed by the petitioner on the grounds firstly that the maintenance could not have been made payable from a date earlier than the date the issues in the case were framed by the court; secondly, that in granting maintenance, the District Judge did not take into consideration the income of the petitioner ; and thirdly, that the amount awarded either by way of litigation expenses or by way of maintenance was excessive.

(3.) THE learned Single Judge before whom the petition came up for hearing, having noticed the cleavage in judicial opinion reflected in various decisions of this court on the point as to from which date an order of maintenance u/s 30 had to be made effective, referred the whole case to a larger Bench ; hence the Full Bench.