BAWA RAM KAMAL DASS Vs. BODH RAJ GUPTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against an order of the District Judge Poonch dated 29 -8 -1970 by which he has granted succession certificate to the respondents Sanatan Dharam Sabha and Bodh Raj Gupta. The appellant filed an application for grant of succession certificate in respect of Rs. 15,000 lying in the Saving Bank Post Office, Rajouri in the name of Bawa Rughnandan Dass Bairagi Manager of a temple known as Thakurdawara Nihala Shah. The appellant claimed to be the duly initiated Chela of the deceased and was therefore entitled to succeed to the pro ­perty left by him. The appellant did not make anybody party to his application but when a notice was published the res ­pondents appeared and filed their objections through Shri Ved Swarup Vakil. The objectors contended that the appellant was an imposter and was not the Chela of Bawa Rughnandan Dass. They further contended that the amount of Rs. 15,000 really belonged to the temple and could not be disbursed to the appel ­lant. The learned Judge examined a large number of wit ­nesses on both sides and after a careful consideration of the evidence found that the appellant Bawa Ram Kamal Das was an imposter and the real claimant was Bodhraj in whose favour he issued the succession certificate.

(2.) WHEN this matter came up to this Court in the first instance, by our order dated 29 -4 -1971 we remanded the case to the D. J. for giving a finding regarding the question as to whom the property in dispute belonged. The learned Judge, after hearing the parties and taking such evidence as was ad ­duced before him. has sent his report in which he has found that there is overwhelming evidence to prove that the amount in question was accumulated by the deceased Bawa Rughnandan Dass from the income of the property of the temple.

(3.) AT the time of arguments. Mr. Kotwal appearing for the appellant submitted two points before us. In the first place he argued that the Court below had no right to embark on an in ­quiry into the rights of the contending parties, and even if he was of the view that the appellant was an imposter, he should have rejected the application and had no power to grant a certificate to the respondent objector. Secondly it was argued that in a summary inquiry held for the purpose of granting succession certificate it was not open to the Court to go into the question of the title of the property. But in the view we take in this case the second point does not arise for consideration at all. S. 7 of the Succession Certificate Act runs as follows: - (1) If the District Court is satisfied that there is ground for entertaining the application, it shall fix a day for the hearing thereof and cause notice of the application and of the day fixed for the hearing - (a) to be served on any person to whom, in the opinion of the Court, special notice of the application should be given, and (b) to be posted on some conspicuous part of the Court house and published in such other manner, if any, as the Court, subject to any rules made by the High Court in this behalf, thinks fit, and upon the day fixed, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, shall proceed to decide in a summary manner the right to the certificate. (2) When the Court decides the right thereto to belong to the applicant, it shall make an order for the grant of the certificate to him. (3) If the Court cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which seem to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a sum ­mary proceeding, it may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto. (4) When there are more applicants than one for a certi ­ficate, and it appears to the Court that more than one of such applicants are interested in the estate of the deceased, the Court may, in deciding to whom the certificate is to be granted, have regard to the extent of interest and the fit ­ness in other respects of the applicants." A perusal of the various sub -clauses of this section would clearly reveal that the object of the legislature is that when an applica ­tion for grant of succession certificate is made, not only a special notice of the application should be given but the notice should be published in such manner as the Court may think fit. The object of publication of the notice is naturally to ascertain the objections against the claim put forward by an applicant so as to avoid the certificate being granted to an imposter. Further S. 7(l)(b) clearly lays down that the Court has to hold a sum ­mary inquiry with respect to the right to the certificate. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court had no jurisdiction to hold a summary inquiry into the right or the claim put forward by the appellant is not correct... Not only this, but S. 7(4) of the Act clearly lays down that when there are more applicants than one, the Court has the power to decide as to whom the certificate should be granted. This sub ­section therefore clearly empowers the Court to decide even the question of the right to receive the certificate as between the petitioner and the objectors. It is true that under sub ­section (3) the Court cannot decide intricate questions of law relating to the right to the certificate.