(1.) THIS appeal arises out of an order passed by District Judge, Jammu, under section 24 of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1955 Act, which corresponds to Section 30 of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1980, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1980 Act, granting maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 500/- per mensem and a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- on account of litigation expenses in favour of the respondent.
(2.) THE respondent brought an application under section 9 of the 1955 Act against the appellant in the Court of District Judge, Jammu. On 24-8-1979, she made an application under section 24 of the said Act that she having no independent income sufficient for her support and the necessary expenses of litigation, the appellant may be ordered to pay to her a sum of Rupees 500/- per mensem as maintenance and a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- by way of litigation expenses. This application was resisted by the appellant on the ground that his total income was Rs. 500/- per month, which he was drawing by way of salary as an employee of Vir and Co., a business concern at Srinagar exclusively owned by his mother. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases and the learned District Judge on consideration of the same eventually came to the conclusion that the appellant was earning something in the neighbourhood of Rs. 4,000/- per month and was also maintaining a car and that the respondent required at least a sum of Rs. 2,000/- to meet the litigation expenses and Rupees 500/- per mensem as maintenance. He accordingly passed the impugned order.
(3.) EVEN so, the next question to be determined is whether the appellant is really out of court for all intents and purposes. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if no appeal is competent against the impugned order, the court has ample power to examine its correctness in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code He has, therefore, prayed that this appeal may be treated as a revision and disposed of as such. The argument in reply, however, is that the 1980 Act being a complete code in itself, there is no room for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court when the aforesaid Act itself does not provide that an order passed by a court under the Act would be revisable under section 115.