(1.) Two doctors, the husband and wife were terminated from service. In a writ petition, registered as SWP No. 303/1994, they challenged their order of termination. Said writ petition was dismissed. Against the order of dismissal, an appeal registered as LPA No. 219/1998, was preferred. Division Bench found that order of termination was without taking recourse to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Division Bench, accordingly, set aside the order of termination. Division Bench directed the Appellant-State to hold inquiry. Division Bench made it clear that ultimate result would depend upon the result of the inquiry which would be conducted now. The inquiry was not conducted. The wife died. Husband reached the age of superannuation. A second writ petition registered as SWP No. 525/2003 was filed seeking service benefits from the date their services were terminated, which termination was set aside by the Division Bench. Writ petition was not contested by filing any objections. By the judgment and order under appeal, the Court directed the Appellant to give to said doctors or their heirs service benefits from the date of termination of their services, which termination, as aforesaid, was set aside by the Division Bench. In the appeal, the grievance of the Appellant is in relation to grant of service benefits from the date of termination of the services of the said doctors, which termination, as aforesaid, was set aside.
(2.) Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that there is now no scope of making fresh inquiry. Learned Counsel, however, submitted that inquiry was made by the Inquiry Officer, appointed by the State, who also submitted a report. Admittedly, the said inquiry was not held on notice to the said doctors. Inquiry report refers to only a telegram, said to have been sent. However, there is no dispute that the said inquiry did not result in an order being passed on the basis thereof. The question is, in such situation, what could be done by the Court.
(3.) Rule 108-B of the applicable Rules deals with the matter, which suggests that when a dismissed Government employee is reinstated but has been fully exonerated, the period of absence from duty shall be treated as period spent on duty. The obligation to order, accordingly, rests in the authority competent. In the instant case, authority competent, i.e, the Appellant-State, was asked to do so by the Division Bench when it interfered with the order of termination. The Appellant-State did nothing.