PARVEEN GUPTA Vs. RAVAIL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The dispute in this appeal relates to 1 kanal 6 marlas of Shamilat land comprised in khasra No.706, situated in village Ramgarh. The owner of this land namely Karim Baksh and other co-sharers had mortgaged this property in the year 1971-72 to the appellants. The said property is stated to have been allotted to respondents without the same having been declared or notified as evacuee property under Section 8 of the Evacuees Property Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act).

(2.) An application under Section 8 of the Act came to be filed by late Hans Raj, predecessor in interest of the appellants before the Deputy Custodian, for restoration of the property in his favour on the ground that he was a mortgagee and stepped into shoes of his ancestors. It was contended that his status as a mortgagee of the property in question was not disputed. The said application came to be allowed by the Deputy Custodian vide its order dt. 30th of Jan'74, and the property in question was restored to the applicant aforementioned. The said order was challenged in a revision before the Custodian General, by the respondents-allottee, which was allowed vide order dt. 7th of April'76, and the order passed by the Deputy Custodian was set aside. The Custodian General allowed the revision petition on the ground that the application for restoration of the property under Section 8 of the Act was filed after 18 years, and as such, was time barred. It was observed that as the non applicant before the Custodian General had not raised any issued against the allotment made in favour of the allottees, therefore, under Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1955, read with Article 142, the non applicant was not entitled to regain the possession by making a claim for restoration. Feeling aggrieved of the above order, the present appeal has been filed.

(3.) Vide order dt. 25th of Sept'92, this court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Custodian General by holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to the application under Section 8 of the Act, and therefore, the basis for dismissing the application on the ground of delay of 18 years is uncalled for. The aforementioned order became the subject matter of challenge in an appeal before a Division Bench of this court in L:PA) No.45/92. The said appeal was dismissed being not maintainable vide order dt. 15th of April'99.