(1.) The two appellants have filed this criminal appeal challenging their conviction and sentence to life imprisonment and R.I. for five years under Section 302/34 and S. 201 of the Indian Penal Code respectively. At the time of hearing of the appeal, one of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants before the Division Bench was that the village Chaukidar is a 'police officer' within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, the confession alleged to have been made before him by the appellants is not admissible. In his support, the learned counsel placed reliance on Emperor v. Mt. Jagia, AIR 1938 Patna 308 : (1938 (39) Cri LJ 428), wherein after considering the Chaukidari Act of 1870 and Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922, the Division Bench of this Court held that the Chaukidar being a member of the village police is a 'police officer' within the meaning of Section 26 of the Act. This judgment has been followed by another Division Bench in Mt. Punia Goalin v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Patna 146 : (1947 (48) Cri LJ 412).
(2.) The Division Bench, which was hearing the appeal, did not agree with the views expressed in Emperor v. Mt. Jagia (1938 (39) Cri LJ 428) and Mt. Punia Goalin v. Emperor (1947 (48) Cri LJ 412) (supra) and has referred the following two questions to the Full Bench for decision :-(i) Whether the village Chaukidar in this State is a 'police officer' within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act ?and(ii) Whether the law laid down by the two Division Benches of this Court in Emperor v. Mt. Jagia, AIR 1938 Patna 308 : (1938 (39) Cri LJ 428) and Mt. Punia Goalin v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Patna 146 : (1947 (48 Cri LJ 412) still represent the correct legal position ?
(3.) Section 25 of the Evidence Act is as under :-