LAWS(PAT)-1999-12-84

SAMPATH KUMAR KARMKAR Vs. GOPAL KUMAR

Decided On December 12, 1999
Sampath Kumar Karmkar Appellant
V/S
Gopal Kumar Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition has been preferred under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 against the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the Munsif -ll, Munger, in Eviction suit No. 29/95.

(2.) THE plaintiff -opposite party filed the above mentioned eviction suit against the defendant - petitioners alleging the petitioners to be a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/ - according to english calendar month. The suit property alongwith others originally belonged to Ram Chandra Prasad father of the plaintiff and the defendant second set and the petitioners singe the days of their forefather were residing over the suit premises and doing business in one pf the rooms as a monthly tenant. After the death of the, father there was a partition suit amongst the co -sharers being Title Suit No. 192 of 1993 and a compromise was arrived at between the parties and the suit property fell into the share of the plaintiff. The petitioners continued as a tenant on a payment of Rs. 500/ - per month and when the plaintiff got the suit property in his share rent was paid to him. According to the plaintiff he has no residence of his own and he was residing with his brother and there was pressure on him to vacate the brother 'shouse and to have accommodation of his own as the suit premise has been alloted to him. Thus the eviction suit has been filed for personal necessity of residential accommodation of the plaintiff over the suit premises. It may be mentioned here that the suit premises consisted of several rooms, kitchen, latrine, verandah and in front side one of the room is being used as a shop by the defendant.

(3.) AFTER considering the evidence of both the parties learned Court below came to the finding that there is bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff and hence the suit premises being a most suitable one decree of eviction has been granted. Partial eviction has also been considered and as it was stated by the defendant in his evidence he did not like to share with the plaintiff in the same shop house. Such partial eviction has also been rejected. There was plea before the Court below and also before this Court that there were vacant premises and the plaintiff is inducting new tenant on those vacant premises even during the pendency of the suit also and, as such, it could be found that the plaintiff was bent upon evicting the defendant - petitioners, although his personal necessity could be satisfied on those vacant premises. Affidavit to that effect has been denied. During the course of argument learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that if necessary he can get affidavit filed by the tenant themselves regarding the vacating of the premises and the new induction of tenants. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order it appears that the learned Munsif held that there is personal bonafide necessity of the plaintiff -opposite party for getting recovery of possession of the suit premises for the purpose of his residential accommodation and also for business purposes. It could be found on perusal of the plaint that the personal necessity was pressed by the plaintiff only for his residential accommodation as it was stated that after the suit building was allotted in his share he wanted the same for his personal accommodation as not a word of business has been stated towards the cause for personal necessity but during the course of evidence it has been stated so. But then also nothing specific has been stated as to what business the plaintiff wants to start when it could be found that he has got already a shop in another house. Thus the personal necessity in respect of business was not in the plaint and hence such unspecified word of business by the plaintiff ought not to have been construed within the purview of personal necessity of the plaintiff in granting eviction decree against the defendant -petitioners. There is also confusing evidence by both the parties regarding vacant shop house by other tenants and induction of new tenants during the pendency of the suit. That point has not been considered by the learned trial court in its proper perspective in the judgment itself. But it appears from the affidavit and counter affidavit filed before this Court that same allegation and counter allegations still remained there.