(1.) The petitioner, an Advocate of this court, has brought a voxpopuli alleging that the respondents have failed to establish Claims Tribunals as contemplated by Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 110 (1) of the Act states: A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as the 'Claims Tribunals') for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both: Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. By Act 47 of 1982, an explanation has been put as a part of the said provision stating: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression 'claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles' includes claims for compensation under Section 92-A. Sub-section (2) of Section 110 states: A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof. As to who may be eligible for such appointment is prescribed in Sub-section (3) of the said section. It states that, a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or is, or has been, a District Judge, or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. Sub-section (4) of the said section states that the State Government may, by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area.
(2.) This case was taken up for hearing at the admission stage on 3.10.1988. The learned Government Advocate, who appeared for the State, prayed for time for obtaining instruction and accordingly a Bench of this court adjourned the case until Puja Holidays. When the case was listed for admission again on 3.11.1988, this court ordered: Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Advocate for the State of Bihar. Since no instruction is available, it is not possible to say one way or the other, whether necessary notification, as contemplated in Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been issued or not. Be that as it may, put up after one month so that in the meanwhile, if no notification has been issued, as required under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State may take steps and issue necessary notification. Adjournments, as prayed for, were granted to the parties until again on 13.2.1989 the matter was heard at some length.
(3.) The learned Government Advocate placed certain instructions given to him by the High Court as well as the State Government. Instructions did not appear to touch the main question involved in this application, namely, whether by conferring power of Claims Tribunal upon one or the other Judicial Officer who may satisfy the requirement of the qualification laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the duty created by Sub-section (2) of Section 110 thereof is discharged or not. The court noted: According to the petitioner a Tribunal has to be constituted independent of any authority functioning or otherwise as a court or Tribunal, in the line of Bihar Administrative Tribunal and such other authority or Tribunal constituted under or by a law, cannot but function as a whole-time Tribunal exercising jurisdiction created by the law. In view of the aforementioned contention learned Government Advocate prayed for two weeks' further time. The case was accordingly adjourned more than once, so that the learned Government Advocate may obtain necessary instructions.